University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

12-2015

Rogue and Deviants: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on
Opportunism in Strategic Alliance Relationships
Anton Pavol Fenik
University of Tennessee - Knoxville, afenik@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Marketing Commons,
Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory
Commons

Recommended Citation
Fenik, Anton Pavol, "Rogue and Deviants: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Opportunism in Strategic
Alliance Relationships. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2015.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/3579

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Anton Pavol Fenik entitled "Rogue and
Deviants: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Opportunism in Strategic Alliance Relationships." I
have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and
recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, with a major in Business Administration.
Charles H. Noble, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Luiz Renato Lima, Kelly S. Hewett, Ernest R. Cadotte
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Rogues And Deviants: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
On Opportunism In Strategic Alliance Relationships

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Anton Pavol Fenik
December 2015

Copyright © 2015 by Anton Pavol Fenik, 2015
All rights reserved.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge and thank my wife and my
children for their patience, encouragement, and for creating a home environment which
allowed me to focus on my studies. I love you guys! You are the source of my strength!
A tremendous thanks goes to my dissertation chair, Dr. Charles Noble. He was
there for me on a regular basis throughout the dissertation process. He kept me focused
and on the right track along the way. Thank you Charlie!!! This would not be possible
without you. Furthermore, I would like to express a special thanks to my dissertation
committee. Dr. Ernie Cadotte, you are too genuine to be real! I am very glad that I had
the opportunity to meet you and to work with you. Thank you for allowing me to use the
Marketplace simulation to collect data for this dissertation as well as for other projects.
Dr. Kelly Hewett, your detailed and constructive feedback since the initial stages of my
dissertation are irreplaceable. I look forward to continuing working with you on this
dissertation and our other project. Dr. Luiz Lima, econometrics seminar was a scary
proposition at first, but you made it manageable and more importantly valuable towards
my research. My appreciation for quantitative research inquiry is stronger thanks to your
input.
There are many people to whom I am grateful for their support and guidance
along this journey. Prior to entering the PhD program at the University of Tennessee I
was fortunate enough to receive a valuable education from my parents, my sister, my
teachers, and from life in general. My parents instilled values in me that allowed me to
navigate through life on my own from an early age. My sister provided me with valuable
insights from her PhD studies. My teachers encouraged me and challenged my thinking

iii

to prepare me for the journey ahead. Without these critical foundations I would not even
have attempted to pursue a PhD degree.
Over the course of my PhD education I encountered many supportive faculty
members, fellow PhD students, and staff in the Marketing and Supply Chain
Management Department, but also outside the department. Special thanks goes to all
the faculty that taught my PhD seminars. Without your guidance it would not be possible
to conquer the “fire hydrant” of knowledge that one is exposed to during a PhD program.

iv

ABSTRACT
Opportunistic behavior is often studied in interfirm relationships, yet we don’t
know the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism
label. Therefore, using game theory as guidance, this dissertation examines the roots of
and influences on two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances.
Specifically, the author suggests that the strategic alliances literature would benefit from
recognizing that opportunistic behaviors don’t always originate from the firm (rogue-firm
opportunism), but instead often originate from individual alliance employees (deviantpersonal opportunism). Moreover, this dissertation examines how relational factors
between two alliance partners impact these two types of opportunistic behaviors. The
relational factors considered in this dissertation are trust, monitoring, and relative
alliance identity.
Hypotheses presented in this dissertation are tested across two studies. The first
study utilizes a behavioral business simulation. It combines survey data collection with
objective performance data obtained from the simulation. The second study investigates
the hypothesized relationships in a cross-sectional sample of strategic alliance
executives. It primarily replies on survey data collection, but also introduces secondary
data from SDC Platinum database.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

Rogue-Firm Versus Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior
The often observed tension between cooperation and competition in strategic
alliances pulls partner firms to behave opportunistically (Li, Boulding, and Staelin 2010;
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Opportunistic behavior has been originally defined as
“self-interest seeking with guile,” (Williamson 1979, p. 6) where guile often is
represented by devious, cunning, sneaky, deceitful, and sometimes outright cheating
alliance partner behavior. Opportunistic behavior poses a real threat to strategic
alliances because an inability to effectively prevent opportunistic behavior causes
alliances to fail. While there are various reasons why alliances may fail, the academic
literature suggests that out of the reported 50% to 80% failure rates of strategic
alliances, a significant portion can be attributed to opportunistic behavior (Cui 2013;
Greve et al. 2010; Kogut 1989; Noordhoff et al. 2011).
Past research in strategic alliances focused on general opportunistic behavior at
partner firm-level only. Wathne and Heide (2000) argue that we must understand
various types of opportunistic behaviors before we can explain properly the high failure
rates. Their conceptual review of the construct is one of only a few reviews that attempt
to build a typology of opportunistic behavior (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). However,
none of the existing conceptual typologies differentiate between firm-level and
individual-level opportunistic behavior. The popular press offers plentiful examples of
opportunism at the individual level in interorganizational relationships. Yet, no attention
has been given to these exhibits of opportunism in the academic literature on strategic
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alliances. The individual-level opportunistic behavior is termed here as deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior, and it is defined as an individual alliance employee’s self-interest
seeking through devious means that threatens the well-being of an alliance, its
members, or both. The firm-level opportunistic behavior is termed here as rogue-firm
opportunistic behavior; and its definition remains consistent with existing literature.
Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is defined here as an alliance partner-firm’s own selfinterest seeking and violations of expected norms of behavior at the expense of another
alliance partner – adapted from Jayachandran et al. (2013).
A majority of the studies on strategic alliances and exchange relationships in
general utilize transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to explain opportunistic
behavior. TCE implicitly treats opportunism as a firm-level phenomenon (Wathne and
Heide 2000); hence, the lack of focus on deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. New
theoretical perspectives must be considered to bring to light the presence of deviantpersonal opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, this dissertation draws on game theory, a
theory that is capable of explaining both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic
behaviors. More on game theory is offered later in this chapter and in Chapter 2.
As a consequence of the dominant presence of TCE, the academic literature
offers countless examples of rogue-firm opportunistic behavior (Anderson et al. 2013)
but lacks examples of deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Table 1 offers some
representative examples of rogue-firm opportunism. This research myopia has created
a gap in the literature. The gap is the lack of focus on deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior and relational factors that can effectively prevent, minimize, or at least detect
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Deviant-personal opportunism examples,
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mostly from popular press, are presented in Table 2. One of the most telling examples
is that of the “Lopez Saga.” Mr. Lopez was indicted by a Detroit grand jury on charges
including fraud and transportation of stolen documents that damaged his employer,
General Motors, and the perception of GM in the eyes of its strategic partners.
BusinessWeek offers a summary of the saga.
During his nine month control of General Motors’ purchasing department, Mr.
Lopez, in an attempt to slash $4 billion from the carmaker’s parts bill, was
accused of employing a range of questionable strategies. Strategic suppliers
alleged that Lopez exaggerated rivals’ bids to compel them to bid lower still. …
[In addition to] his rush to cut costs, Lopez leaked suppliers’ proprietary
information to the competition. (Kelly and Kerwin 1992)
Many more examples of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors exist. Many
come from the pharmaceutical industry, an often studied industry because of its heavy
use of strategic alliance partnerships. In addition to the two examples offered in Table 2,
GlaxoSmithKline, Abbott Laboratories, Johnson & Johnson, K.V. Pharmaceutical, and
Synthes were, in recent history, all charged with a variety of behavioral misconduct
originating from various management levels (Thomas and Schmidt 2012). The
behavioral misconduct is often initiated by single manager or a small deviant group of
two or three managers whose misbehaviors were not sanctioned by the firm. These are
all major companies in the industry and are regularly creating strategic alliances with
other pharmaceutical firms.
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Table 1. Examples of Rogue-Firm Opportunistic Behavior
Source

Opportunistic Behavior

Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994* Manufacturer-reseller relationships: Resellers violating
explicit resale agreements.
Wilkie, Mela, and Gundlach
1998*

Suppliers providing an alluring but insincere offer to
sell a product or service they do not intend or want to
sell.

Murry and Heide 1998*

Manufacturer-retailer relationships: Retailers receiving
a priori allowances for displaying promotional materials
without following through on the original agreement.

Lee 1998

Exporter-importer relationships: Exporters sometimes
intentionally lie to importers in order to make the
transaction.

Achrol and Gundlach 1999

Vertically arranged relationships: breaching formal and
informal agreement.

Jap and Anderson 2003

Supplier-buyer relationships: making false
accusations, failure to provide proper notification, not
doing as promised.

Anderson and Jap 2005

Supplier-customer relationships: Supplier cutting
corners by applying 2 instead of 3 coats on auto parts
without telling the customer.

*Adopted summary from Wathne and Heide (2000)
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Table 2. Examples of Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior
Source

Opportunistic Behavior

Phillips 1982*

Salespeople exaggerating expenditure reports.

Kelly and Kerwin 1992*

Mr. Lopez single-handedly exaggerating the bids from
rival suppliers to obtain lower bids and leaking
information to competition.

Lyons, Krachenberg, and
Henke 1990

Corporate-level cooperative relationships
systematically undermined by individual purchasing
agents across automotive firms treating suppliers in an
opportunistic fashion.

Healy and Palepu 2003

Mr. Skilling, Mr. Fastow, and Mr. Lay keeping losses
from JEDI joint venture with CalPERS off of Enron’s
books by creating Chewco L.P. Ultimately these
practices led to Enron’s bankruptcy, also affecting its
partner firms.

Dash 2004

Brystol-Myers Squibb executives pressuring
wholesalers to buy substantial amounts of
pharmaceuticals ahead of anticipated demand in order
to look attractive in front of business partners of
current and future joint ventures.

SEC 2003

Four executives of Nicor Energy LLC (a joint venture)
inflating net income by $11 million. Consequently,
parent companies of the alliance experienced
unexpected transaction costs.

Koleva 2012

“Protocol 007” scandal: MERCK’s lab supervisor was
caught manually changing test results for MMR-II
vaccine in order to deliver on its business partner’s
specifications. The business partner was the US
government.

*Adopted summary from Wathne and Heide (2000)
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Since opportunistic behavior is often the central construct of interest in strategic
alliances, the research agenda in marketing and management focuses on explaining
and minimizing the risk of opportunism. Therefore, the research focus is predominantly
on either control mechanisms or relational factors that help with discouraging and
capturing opportunistic behavior (e.g., Sartor and Beamish 2014; Xu, Fenik, and Shaner
2014). The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate relational factors that
can effectively explain both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. To
date, the vast majority of research has focused on control mechanisms (economic
perspective) or relational factors (social exchange theory perspective) in isolation when
attempting to understand opportunism. The key argument here is that instead of
focusing on one perspective or one factor, it is fruitful to theory and practice to look at
how these factors work together, which factors are dominant preventers of opportunism,
how some of the factors interact, and ultimately how they impact behavior of alliance
partners. Recent research calls align well with this argument (Heide, Wathne, and
Rokkan 2007; Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).

A Game Theoretical Perspective
The latest advancements in game theory successfully bring the rational
economic perspective together with the more sociological perspective. Gintis (2009)
notes:
The various behavioral disciplines (economics, psychology, sociology, politics,
anthropology, and biology) are currently based on distinct principles and rely on
distinct types of data. However, game theory fosters a unified framework
available to all the behavioral disciplines. This facilitates cross-disciplinary
6

information exchange that may eventually culminate in a degree of unity within
the behavioral sciences now enjoyed only by the natural sciences. (p. 48)
Therefore, game theory is used as the guiding theory for this dissertation. Game
theory helps us to explain the behavior of individuals or groups (i.e., alliance employees
or alliance partner-firms) whose outcomes depend on the behavior of others in a
strategic interaction. Moreover, game theory is helpful to predict how various factors of
the strategic interaction will influence the behaviors of these individuals or groups
(Axelrod 2006; Chen and Chen 2011; Cox 2004; Uzea and Fulton 2009).
Game theory has come a long way from single-shot (i.e., one round) prisoner’s
dilemma games and Nash equilibrium. Game theory addresses the behavior of two
parties in a so-called “mixed-motive social dilemma” (Dawes 1980). This dilemma exists
in strategic alliances at the firm- and individual-level, because “parties often have
motives to both cooperate and compete with each other, to maximize the collective
interest yet also maximize their self-interest at the expense of the collective interest”
(Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles 2007, p. 468). Therefore, game theory researchers focus on
studying factors that can influence levels of opportunistic behavior between two or more
parties. Various game types have been investigated (e.g., single- vs multiple-shot
games, full- vs partial-information available, trust games, prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum
game, social goods game, tit-for-tat, and many others), but the most applicable game to
strategic alliances is the prisoner’s dilemma game (Parkhe 1993). Experimental
economists playing out the prisoner’s dilemma game investigate how monitoring
(Axelrod 2006), trust (Cox 2004), and social identity (Chen and Chen 2011), among
other factors, influence the utility function of each party involved in the game. Thus, a

7

prisoner’s dilemma application of game theory is very suitable to help explain how these
factors affect rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunism in strategic alliances. While
this dissertation draws on other theories (transaction cost economics, social exchange
theory, and social identity theory), game theory provides a foundation for all the
theoretical lenses used in this dissertation.

Research Questions
The main objective of this study is twofold. First, I seek to build on and to
enhance existing knowledge of opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances. Based on
business press examples and some exploratory field interviews, the objective is to
differentiate between rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Despite
evidence from popular press that deviant-personal opportunism is a problem, the
academic literature in strategic alliances does not recognize this phenomenon. To
address this phenomenon, it is imperative to consider other theoretical views than TCE,
because TCE’s focus on firm-level analysis offers at best a limited explanation of
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Game theory (GT) and its incorporation of the
social identity theory (SIT), social exchange theory (SET), and transaction cost
economics (TCE) are used as the conceptual perspectives to explain both rogue-firm
and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Second, this study introduces relative
alliance identity as a relational factor that is expected to impact deviant-personal and
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors above and beyond other relational factors explored
here; specifically, partner monitoring and trust. Moreover, the game theory suggests
that the interaction between trust and monitoring explains and predicts opportunism
more holistically. To accomplish these objectives, the primary research question guiding
8

this study is: What are the roots of and influences on rogue-firm and deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances? Within this overall research question, the
more specific sub-questions came to surface:
1) Which of the studied (relative alliance identity, monitoring, and trust) relational
factors is most effective at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior, and
which is most effective at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior?
2) Do trust and monitoring factors exhibit a supplementary (additive) or
complementary (interactive) role in explaining the two types of opportunism?
3) Do contextual considerations, such as stable relationship conditions, affect these
relational factors differently?
4) Does rogue-firm opportunistic behavior affect alliance outcomes differently from
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior?

Contributions
This study contributes to marketing knowledge in several areas. First, marketing
literature has not explicitly addressed rogue-firm versus deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior in business-to-business relationships, such as strategic alliances. This new
conceptualization is likely to refresh our perspective on opportunistic behavior and,
consequently, improve exchange relationship theories. Second, marketing literature
thus far has mostly utilized TCE, SET, and commitment-trust theory. While these
theories greatly contribute to knowledge in marketing, they are not sufficient to explain
deviant-personal opportunism and all the factors studied here. Game theory and its
incorporation of TCE, SET, and SIT theories brings in a fresh perspective on
opportunism and provides arguments for the interactive relationship between trust and
9

monitoring and its effect on the two types of opportunism. Third, social identity theory
has been primarily applied at the individual level within a single organization, but it has
not been considered in strategic alliances where individuals and firms have to cooperate
while also competing. Game theory addresses identity issues within a mixed-motive
social dilemma setting that is present in strategic alliances. Moreover, the use of game
theory as the overarching and foundational theory for the three factors and their
respective theories (i.e., monitoring and TCE, trust and SET, relative alliance identity
and SIT) for the purposes of studying rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior will improve our knowledge of strategic alliances.
This study also contributes to marketing practice. First, understanding which
relational mechanisms reduce rogue-firm and which reduce deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior can offer potential cost savings for alliance partner-firms through
an establishment of more efficient relational systems. Second, finding what role a
relative alliance identity plays in minimizing opportunistic behavior is managerially
important because managers need to know how much effort should be put into building
a sense of identity among alliance partners. Third, the need to monitor and to build trust
is a relatively well established practice in corporate world; however, how these two
interact and to what extent managers should invest in one, the other, or both
simultaneously is of interest to managers. In summary, helping managers realize the
optimal investments in a mix of relational factors can help them engage more effectively
with their exchange partners.
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Relational Factors
Studies examining strategic alliances utilize several streams of literature, but
always in isolation. While isolated literature streams have yielded powerful insights,
such isolated perspectives also have limited external validity and have constrained the
academic conversation about the studied phenomenon (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).
Therefore, one of the objectives of this research is to use game theory to integrate
distinct literatures in order to explain exchange relationships within the context of
strategic alliances. I utilize game theory in this dissertation because it is a foundational
theory for the streams of literature relevant to the relational factors studied here. Game
theory brings together three perspectives and their key constructs that influence
relational behaviors. Together, these key constructs impact rogue-firm and deviantpersonal opportunistic behavior. Specifically, game theory ties together monitoring of
alliance partner (TCE), relative alliance identity (SIT), and trust in the alliance partner
(SET). The three relational factors and their impact on opportunistic behavior and
outcomes are depicted in the conceptual model of this dissertation presented in Figure
1.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) draws on a game theory-based argument
which suggests that monitoring of alliance partners should aid in suppressing
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). Under certain assumptions, game theory
suggests that monitoring creates a game where full information is available to all
participants, thus dwarfing opportunism. In other words, monitoring eliminates, at least
to a certain degree, information asymmetries often present in strategic relationships.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model

Monitoring
While “monitoring programs are integral part of many firms’ relationship
strategies” (Ghosh and John 1999), strategic alliance studies do not directly discuss and
empirically test monitoring mechanisms. In arm’s length B2B relationships literature,
Heide et al. (2007, p. 426) support this claim by stating that “…the monitoring
phenomenon remains poorly documented” in interfirm relationships. Narayandas and
Rangan (2004, p. 75) note that “a worthwhile area for research is to identify whether
and when performance evaluation based on outcomes [outcome-based monitoring] or
actions [behavior-based monitoring] is more critical to the development of [an interfirm]
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relationship.” Calls to enhance the theory of monitoring remain mostly unanswered
(Jensen 1998).
Relative Alliance Identity
According to game theory, low group identity leads to an inefficient equilibrium
solution in a minimum effort game (Chen and Chen 2011), and in a repeated-play public
goods game a team identity limits shirking and free-riding behavior (Eckel and
Grossman 2005). This incorporation of social identity into game theory can offer a fresh
take on a range of phenomena in organizational studies. “The turn to identity could be
regarded as a source of revitalization for existing research areas, novel in that it
continues establishing lines of inquiry by different means” (Alvesson, Ashcraft, and
Thomas 2008, p. 6). It is argued in this dissertation that assessing to what degree
individual employees of an alliance identify with the alliance as opposed to their
respective alliance partner firms can help us better understand the complexity of the
largely unexplored (Wathne and Heide 2000) phenomenon of interest – opportunistic
behavior.
Social identity theory is based on the minimal group paradigm, also known as the
psychological group (Tajfel 1982). The main argument of the theory states that
members of the in-group do not even have to explicitly interact with other in-group
members to exhibit favorable behavior towards in-group members and unfavorable
behavior towards out-group members (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Extension of the psychological group suggests that the out-group does not have
to explicitly exist. The out-group only needs to be ingrained in the psyche of the in-group
members. Once the psychological out-group exists in the in-group members’ psyche,
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the in-group members will start to behave favorably towards other in-group members.
An isomorphic argument in strategic alliances would suggest that if the alliance
management can create a sense of threat from other competitors in the market, it can
consequently create a sense of psychological in-group among alliance employees. The
competitors do not necessarily have to be explicitly described beyond the fact that they
pose a threat to the livelihood of the alliance and its partners. This argument is
supported by Santos and Eisenhardt (2005), who state that “identity can be a source of
competitive strength by distinguishing the organization from potential competitors.” The
word potential is key in their statement. A competitor (i.e., an out-group) does not
necessarily have to explicitly exist at the moment. Thus, competitive intensity in the
market and market uncertainty, together also known as environmental dynamism (Miles,
Covin, and Heeley 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison 2001) can have an impact
on relative alliance identity. In this case, the environmental dynamism makes the ingroup more salient to members of the group. In prisoner’s dilemma and battle-of-the
sexes games, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) support the notion that when
groups are more salient, group membership significantly affects individual behavior.
While the interest in this dissertation is to explore relational and not environmental
factors, due to the above reasons, it is necessary to at least control for environmental
dynamism. Furthermore, environmental dynamism has been shown to affect other
relational factors as well as opportunistic and cooperative behaviors (Jansen, Vera, and
Crossan 2009; Joshi and Campbell 2003).
“Identity offers an alternative to more rigid and suboptimal control strategies like
[monitoring] behavioral rules and output measures” (Alvesson, Ashcraft, and Thomas
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2008). In other words, building an argument for an opportunistic behavior based on the
relative alliance identity rather than monitoring of alliance partners is likely to offer a
superior predictive and explanatory power. This argument is supported by Santos and
Eisenhardt (2005), who conceptually argue that “identity often dominates efficiency
[TCE perspective] considerations” when it comes to organizational boundaries. It is
argued here that alliances that are able to reshape the boundaries of their partners such
that the bordering partner boundary weakens while the outer boundary of the alliance
strengthens will experience decreased level of both rogue-firm and deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior. From game theory point of view, such reshaping of a boundary
creates “identity costs” (Uzea and Fulton 2009) which hurt parties that choose to defect
(i.e., be opportunistic) in the prisoner’s dilemma game (i.e., the alliance).
Some may see relationship marketing literature as synonymous with social
identity literature. While the majority of scholars have come to the conclusion that the
two in fact offer distinct perspectives on organizational studies, it is useful to address
the concern. Identification with a group can exist even in the absence of interpersonal
cohesion, similarity, or interaction. The absence of the relational factors (e.g., trust)
does not change the fact that social identification (e.g., relative alliance identity) impacts
affect and behavior. A series of laboratory experiments proved that in-group favoritism
occurs even without interaction with in-group members or with other out-groups (Tajfel
1982). Explicit random assignment of participants into groups leads to discrimination
against out-groups and enhanced cooperation between members of an in-group
(Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn 1980). Social identity is a psychological phenomenon.
The in-group members “credit the group with a psychological reality apart from their
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relationships with its members” (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Ultimately, relational factors
such as trust don’t have to be present to have an identity.
SIT has been initially conceptualized at the individual level (Tajfel and Turner
1979). Thus, the relative alliance identity mechanism is expected here to perform best
against deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. However, in more recent literature,
arguments are being made for a group level of analysis (Ashmore, Deaux, and
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Therefore, it is expected that relative alliance identity will also
influence rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.
Trust
From the game theory perspective, trust “facilitates cooperation because a party
who believes the partner is trustworthy will develop a higher willingness to risk, and
therefore in conditions of risk, the party is more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior”
(Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles 2007, p. 474). In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the riskier but
more profitable option is for parties to cooperate. With trust, one is more likely to
engage in the riskier proposition due to the belief that the other party will choose to
cooperate. This basic idea is also reflected in social exchange theory, where trust is an
important relational mechanism that encourages future exchange in a relationship
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). The definitions of trust vary across studies. However, at the
core of each definition is the belief that the other party in a relationship will do as
promised. Therefore, trust is defined here as the perceived credibility that the alliance
partner will behave in the best interest of the exchange relationship.
Trust as an antecedent to relational behaviors has consistently been found to be
an important factor in relationship marketing literature (Hewett and Bearden 2001).
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However, its effect on relational behaviors proves to be a two-sided coin. One side of
the coin suggests that when trust is established between business partners,
commitment levels rise (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Trust in B2B relationships has been
shown to lead to lower levels of opportunistic behaviors (Rindfleisch and Moorman
2001). As a result of lower opportunistic behaviors, partners are less hesitant to make
financial and knowledge idiosyncratic investments (Noordhoff et al. 2011). These
investments in turn offer higher chances of a healthy collaborative relationship between
partners.
On the other side of the coin, scholars have shown that in highly trusted
relationships, partners stop challenging each other’s thinking because their way of
thinking merges. Because it is impolite to challenge a “friend” (Anderson and Jap 2005),
partners fail to switch to new partners when they should (Gu, Hung, and Tse 2008), and
partners have a better chance of getting away with opportunistic behavior (Selnes and
Sallis 2003). This view is supported by Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002), who caution that
empirical evidence does not support the positive relationship between trust and
performance and caution that “trust may be in danger of being oversold and
inappropriately used in practice.”
These conflicting views have received more attention in recent literature. For
example, Noordhoff et al. (2011) show that embedded ties between supplier and
customer firms have both bright and dark sides that influence supplier innovation.
Similarly, Anderson and Jap (2005) argue that “[t]he very factors [trusted & close
relationships] that make partnerships with customers or suppliers beneficial can leave
those relationships vulnerable to deterioration” (p. 76). The authors offer a telling
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example. A supplier of auto parts developed a very close relationship with its automaker
customer. They built trust with the customer by encouraging its employees to go to
dinners, play football, and go to other social events with employees from the automaker
firm. Once the trust was established, the purchasing department eased up on its total
quality management practices. As a result, the supplier started to cut its production
costs by eliminating one of three coats of paint. The cost savings were not shared with
the customer. “In this manner, the trust, social relationships and investments that were
developed to make the relationship successful became the doorway to the dark side”
(Anderson and Jap 2005, p. 77).
This discussion illustrates the strengths and the weaknesses of purely trustbased relationships. Moreover, existing studies focus on organizational level of analysis
only and, therefore, do not explicitly investigate the existence of deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior. Thus, it is imperative to push research to explore other factors
and theoretical perspectives that can together better explain and predict rogue-firm and
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior.

Alliance Partner Stability
Game theory suggests that any factors that can destabilize a strategic
relationship will negatively impact relational factors between strategic partners and
consequently increase the chances of opportunistic behavior (Parkhe 1993). In strategic
alliances, such destabilizing factors can originate from internal sources since there are
at least two partners to an alliance among which competition or sources of uncertainties
can exist. If the partners themselves are competitors, as is the case in horizontal
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alliances, then there is a stronger sense of internal competitive intensity than in the case
of vertical alliances (Luo, Rindfleisch, and Tse 2007).
Differences in national and organizational cultures between alliance partners can
also act as a destabilizing force in a strategic relationship. “The underlying values and
attitudes of different cultural groups can influence the behavior of those groups, as well
as the nature of decisions they make” (Hewett and Bearden 2001). Empirical studies
exist linking cultural distance (Hofstede 1980) to level of cooperativeness among two
parties from different national cultures (Chatman and Barsade 1995; Li et al. 2010;
Williams, Han, and Qualls 1998).
Another potentially destabilizing factor is the degree to which an alliance partner
is dependent on the other. If one party depends on another, the dependent party tends
to lose its autonomy and power to decide for itself (Geyskens et al. 1996). Such a loss
of autonomy can result in distrust, less identification with the power-wielding partner,
and implementation of more robust monitoring mechanisms. Also, the power-wielding
partner may see an opportunity to act opportunistically against a partner whose
defenses are weakened due to being dependent on the partner. Therefore, it is argued
in this dissertation that stable partner conditions, such as partner independence,
cooperation rather than competition among partners, and organizational culture
proximity will positively impact relational factors between two partners.

Method Overview
This dissertation carried out two studies using diverse settings and data
collections to assure a rigorous understanding of relational factors in strategic alliances
and their combined influence on rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior.
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First, relevant academic literature in marketing and other disciplines was reviewed. The
literature review was supplemented with qualitative fieldwork data in an effort to arrive at
a conceptually sound and practically grounded model. Then, the conceptual model and
its hypotheses were tested using two studies. In the first study, the model and the
hypotheses were tested using a multi-period business simulation. Laboratory simulation
techniques have been used extensively in the behavioral sciences to provide an
analogy to a variety of social phenomena often related to the business world (Gundlach,
Achrol, and Mentzer 1995). The simulation was a suitable environment to study
exchange relationships directly in a laboratory-like setting. The analysis of the
conceptual model presented in this dissertation benefited from such laboratory
conditions. In the second study, a sample of relevant strategic alliances was obtained
along with some variables of interest from SDC Platinum database of strategic
alliances. Key informants from firms within this sample were approached to participate
in a large-scale, survey-based study. First, the measurement model was examined to
ascertain psychometrically sound measures for both studies. Then, the hierarchical
linear regression was used for analysis.

Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a
detailed literature review of related theories and phenomena from marketing and other
fields. Hypotheses are offered in this chapter as well. The next chapter, Chapter 3,
describes two studies and their respective research methodologies used to test the
conceptual model. Chapter 4 presents the analysis and findings of the two studies.
Chapter 5 offers an in-depth discussion of the results, a contribution discussion for
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academia and practitioners, future research, limitations of the dissertation, and a
conclusion.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Strategic Alliances and Marketing
The exchange function is recognized as the primary function of marketing
(Maclaran 2009). The examination of antecedents and consequences of various types
of exchange relationships is arguably the primary area of research inquiry in marketing
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). One place where these
exchange relationships present themselves is in strategic alliances. Strategic alliances
play a vital role in today’s global marketplace and thus are a key element of marketing
strategy (Fang et al. 2008). Definitions of strategic alliances are diverse across the
academic literature. Similarly, among practitioners, a regional chapter representative of
the Association of Strategic Alliances Professionals (ASAP) stated in one of the
fieldwork interviews that ASAP’s ongoing struggle is to offer a unifying definition of the
term strategic alliance. Representative definitions from across the academic literature
are presented in Table 3. The common thread across these definitions is part of the
definition used here. In this dissertation, strategic alliances are defined as collaborative
exchange relationships between two or more firms to gain a competitive advantage from
joint efforts, risk sharing, and meeting complex market demands.
When effective, strategic alliances can produce a variety of marketing benefits to
partner firms. New product development, marketing initiatives, customer orientation,
competitor orientation, and financial performance are just a few examples of marketing
phenomena well represented in the strategic alliances research. An example of each of
the mentioned marketing phenomena is offered next.
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Table 3. Definitions of Strategic Alliances
Source

Construct Name

Definition

Gulati 1995

Alliance

Any independently initiated interfirm
link that involves exchange, sharing,
or co-development.

Rindfleisch and Moorman
2001

New Product
Alliances

Formalized collaborative
arrangements among two or more
organizations to jointly acquire and
utilize information and know-how
related to the research and
development (R&D) of new product (or
process) innovations.

Rindfleisch and Moorman
2003

New Product
Alliances

Formal collaborative arrangements
among two or more firms to conduct
these [R&D] activities.

Swaminathan and
Moorman 2009

Marketing
Alliances

Formalized collaborative
arrangements between two or more
organizations focused on downstream
value chain activities.

Krishnan, Martin, and
Noorderhaven 2006

Strategic Alliance

Any extended cooperative agreement
intended to jointly develop,
manufacture, and/or distribute
products.

Bucklin and Sengupta
1993

Co-marketing
Alliance

Contractual relationships undertaken
by firms whose respective products
are complements in the marketplace.

Kale, Singh, and
Perlmutter 2000

Strategic Alliance

A purposive strategic relationship
between independent firms that share
compatible goals, strive for mutual
benefits, and acknowledge a high
level of mutual dependence.
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Strategic alliances are often created to develop new products as a response to
complex market demands. Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) find that alliances with
higher levels of knowledge redundancy and lower levels of relational embeddedness
are associated with lower levels of information acquisition but higher levels of
information utilization. The high levels of information utilization help alliance partners to
enjoy increased levels of “new product creativity and faster speed of development due
to synergy created by the redundancy of their product development-related knowledge,
skills, and capabilities” (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001).
Strategic alliances are also useful with co-marketing efforts. Bucklin and
Sengupta (1993) investigate co-marketing alliances, which are alliances between two or
more partners who together market complementary products or product lines. Through
the combined marketing efforts, each partner benefits because co-marketing alliances
can intensify and build consumers’ awareness of benefits derived from the products’
complementarities. The authors suggest that co-marketing alliances can enhance the
competitive advantage of each partner. They show that project selection, finding the
right partner, and minimizing power imbalances have a direct effect on the effectiveness
of co-marketing alliances.
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003) study the effects of alliance characteristics on
customer orientation. They find empirical support for the hypothesis that a firm’s
participation in horizontal alliances weakens that firm’s customer orientation. This is not
the case in vertical alliances. The reasoning is based on the idea that when a firm allies
with a competitor, then the firm must be overly vigilant of the possibility that the
competitor in the alliance will act against the interest of the focal firm. Therefore, the
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focal firm will have to invest in monitoring of the partner rather than in understanding the
customer. Furthermore, the authors suggest that a third-party monitor (e.g., government
agency) and strong relational ties between the competing partners can attenuate the
need to monitor each other and instead the slack resources can be devoted to customer
orientation.
Luo et al. (2007) show how the profitability of horizontal alliances depends on
competitor orientation. They find that a firm’s level of participation in horizontal rather
than vertical alliances has an inverted U-shaped relationship with return on equity of
that firm. This association strengthens when the focal firm’s competitor orientation
focuses on building effective relationship between the allying rivals. However, if the
focal firm’s competitor orientation focuses more on destroying the competition, then the
inverted U-shaped relationship weakens such that the return on equity is lower and the
dark side of the horizontal alliances presents itself sooner.
While these examples illustrate that strategic alliances can have a positive
impact on various marketing-related phenomena, academic and popular press literature
report that 50% to 80% of strategic alliances fail (Cui 2013; Greve et al. 2010; Kogut
1989; Noordhoff et al. 2011). Various reasons have been attributed to failures of
strategic alliances. However, the most common reason attributed to the high failure
rates is opportunistic behavior within an alliance. It is argued here that opportunistic
behavior can be rogue-firm (i.e., firm-level) or deviant-personal (i.e., individual-level) in
nature. Therefore, the next two sections review literature relevant to both rogue-firm and
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Hypotheses regarding the impact of rogue-firm
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and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior on alliance outcomes are developed in the
two sections.

Rogue-Firm Opportunistic Behavior
Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior often is the primary construct of interest in
strategic alliances research. A review of empirical research investigating opportunistic
behavior and its antecedents is offered in Table 4. Rogue-firm opportunism exists in
strategic alliances because of what game theory refers to as “mixed-motive social
dilemma” (Dawes 1980). This dilemma exists in strategic alliances because “parties
often have motives to cooperate and compete with each other, to maximize the
collective interest yet also maximize their self-interest at the expense of the collective
interest” (Ferrin et al. 2007, p. 468). Marketing scholars have also referred to this
dilemma as a cooperation-competition tension (Li et al. 2010).
Definitions of opportunistic behavior differ across contexts, but the majority adapt
the definition offered by Williamson (1979). He defines opportunism as “self-interest
seeking with guile.” In his later work, Williamson (1985) elaborates more on this
definition and explains that the guile presents itself in practice as a form of “lying,
stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or
otherwise confuse” (p. 47). Others have added to this list by equating the guile with
shirking, deceiving, misrepresenting, cunning, evasive, devious, or deceitful behavior of
one party towards another. In more general terms, opportunism can be thought of as an
engagement in a behavior that goes against existing understanding or even against
existing contract. Table 5 offers a representative list of definitions of opportunism seen
in academic literature. In this dissertation, I define rogue-firm opportunistic behavior as
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an alliance partner’s own self-interest seeking and violations of expected norms of
behavior at the expense of the other alliance partner – adapted from Jayachandran et
al. (2013). Research devoted to conceptualization of types of opportunism is almost
non-existent, despite the call for the need to understand different types of opportunism
(Wathne and Heide 2000). To the best of my knowledge, only two manuscripts exist that
attempt to develop a typology of rogue-firm opportunism.
One of the two typologies is offered by Wathne and Heide (2000). They
conceptually differentiate between active and passive opportunistic behavior. Active
opportunism takes place when a partner purposefully breaks the contract in some way.
For example, in marketing alliances and in horizontal alliances, territorial exclusivity
contracts often exist between partners. These contracts are often and purposefully
violated (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide, Dutta, and Bergen 1998). In R&D alliances,
contracts are written to protect intellectual property brought into the alliance by each
party and to establish levels of knowledge transfers. However, it is very common to see
incomplete R&D contracts because the outcomes of R&D alliances are often unclear at
the outset of the alliance (Xu, Fenik, and Shaner 2014). Purposeful violations of R&D
contracts take place because of the incompleteness of the contracts.
Passive opportunism takes place when a partner to the exchange purposefully
holds back effort, know-how, or information that would otherwise enhance the outcomes
of a partnership. Such hold backs drive Wathne and Heide (2000) to define passive
opportunism as opportunism by omission. When a party omits some information from
another party, it is not necessarily breaking an explicit contract, but it is jeopardizing the
full potential of the partnership.
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Table 4. Representative Empirical Findings of Opportunism

Source

Independent Variables and Hypotheses

Dependent Variable

Control Variables

Theory

Empirical Setting

John 1984

Bureaucratic structuring (+)
Perception of coercive power (+)
Noncontingent power (- partial)

Opportunism

NA

TCE
Attribution
theory

Dealer relationships of
one major oil supplier

Gundlach et al.
1995

Disproportional commitment (+ marginal)
Long-term commitment intensions (ns)
Relational social norms (-)

Opportunism

NA

TCE
Social
Exchange
Theory

Supplier-Buyer multiperiod behavioral
simulation

Dahlstrom and
Nygaard 1999

Interfirm cooperation (- partial support)
Formalization (-)

Franchisor
opportunism

NA

TCE
Control theory

Franchisee-franchisor
relationships in
Norwegian distribution
system

Kale et al. 2000

(RC) Relational capital (+)
(CM) Conflict management (+)

Protection of
proprietary assets

Partner fit:
complementarity &
compatibility
Alliance governance
Prior alliances
Nationality
Age

TCE
Relational
exchange
theory
Social
exchange
theory

Strategic Alliances

Hewett and
Bearden 2001

Trust (+)

Cooperation
(opposite of
opportunism)

Subsidiaries sales
Industry dummy
variables

The
commitmenttrust theory
Social
exchange
theory

Foreign subsidiaries of
U.S.-based global
firms
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Table 4. Continued
Source

Independent Variables and Hypotheses

Dependent Variable

Control Variables

Theory

Empirical Setting

Carson, Madhok,
and Wu 2006

Volatility w/ formal govern. (+)
Volatility w/ relational govern. (ns)
Ambiguity w/ formal govern. (ns)
Ambiguity w/ relational govern. (+)

Supplier opportunism

Reputation
Continuity
Trust
History of relationship
Specific assets
Duration
Number of suppliers
Development work
Radical innovation

TCE
Sociological
arguments

Outsourced R&D
relationships for NPD –
outsourcing R&D
suppliers

Heide et al. 2007

(OM) Output monitoring (-)
(BM) Behavior monitoring (+)
BM x microlevel social contracts for behavior (-)
OM x microlevel social contracts for output (-)

Supplier opportunism

Relative firm size
Supplier’s
dependence on the
buyer
Opportunism at time
1

TCE
Reactance
theory
Social contract
theory

Supplier-buyer
relationships

Crosno and
Dahlstrom 2010

Own transaction specific investments (+)
Partner transaction specific investments (ns)
Environmental uncertainty (ns)
Behavioral uncertainty (ns)
Dependence (ns)
Centralization (+)
Formalization (-)
Communication (-)
Norms (-)

Opportunism

NA

TCE
Resource
dependence
theory
Relational
contracting
theory

Marketing channel
members
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Table 5. Definitions of Opportunism
Source

Construct Name

Definition

Williamson 1979

Opportunism

Self-interest seeking with guile

John 1984

Opportunistic
Behavior

Deceit-oriented violation of implicit or
explicit promises about one’s
appropriate or required role behavior.

Wuyts and Geyskens
2005

Opportunism

Self-interest seeking with guile; it
includes such behaviors as lying and
cheating as well as more subtle forms
of deceit, such as not fully disclosing
information or violating the spirit of an
agreement.

Luo 2006a

Opportunism in a
cooperative
alliance

The act or behavior performed by one
party from one country to seek its
unilateral gains at the substantial
expense of other parties from other
countries by breaching contract or
agreement, exercising private control,
withholding or distorting information,
withdrawing commitments or
promises, shirking obligations, or
grafting joint earnings.

Jayachandran et al. 2013

Postcontractual
Opportunism

One party acting in its own selfinterest at the expense of the other
party and violating expected norms of
behavior.
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In their multi-method empirical study, Seggie, Griffith, and Jap (2013) examine
how active and passive opportunism in interfirm relationships hinder satisfaction with
the relationships’ performance. In their first experimental study, they show that firms
have more tolerance towards passive opportunism than active opportunism. However,
their follow up field study reveals that over an extended period of time, passive
opportunism has a more detrimental impact on relationship satisfaction than active
opportunism. Their second experimental study suggests that active opportunism
immediately raises transaction costs and thus the value of the relationship is lowered. If
passive opportunism lingers over time, the transaction costs necessary to counter
passive opportunism become higher than the transaction costs needed to counter active
opportunism. Overall, their findings support the notion that active and passive
opportunism uniquely affect performance outcomes (Wathne and Heide 2000).
In his conceptual review of opportunism in inter-firm exchanges in emerging
markets, Luo (2006b) differentiates between a strong and a weak form of opportunism.
The strong form of opportunism presents itself when an alliance partner directly violates
the contract of an alliance. Alliance contracts incorporate norms, clauses, and
conditions that each party must follow. Luo (2006b) offers an extensive list of how
strong form violations present themselves in practice. The strong form violations of a
contract include:
1) deceiving another party in critical information sharing as required by contract
2) stealing joint assets that belong to all exchange parties
3) expropriating critical knowledge or technology that belong to all exchange
parties
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4) exploiting a partner firm’s specific assets or appropriating a partner firm’s key
personnel or know-how without provision or remedy
5) colluding or bribing another party’s personnel (executive or board members) so
that collective decisions or activities are undertaken only to the bribing party’s
own advantage
6) failing to invest various resources, such as technologies, managerial expertise,
capital, or human talents as required by contract
7) cheating in recording and disclosing accounting information in search of higher
unilateral returns or dividends
8) evading contractual obligations in selling joint products, upgrading technologies,
or building distribution channels
9) terminating the contract or agreement without a partner firm’s consensus
10) failing to honor contractual liabilities in undertaking collaborative operations or
collective activities, such as joint research and development, joint production and
marketing, and joint training and management
The weak form of opportunism presents itself when an alliance partner violates
existing relational norms that are a common understanding among parties involved in
the relationship but that are not explicitly stated in a contract. Examples of weak form
opportunism are:
1) terminating unwritten commitments or dishonoring oral promises
2) not adhering to trust-building and equity-exchange principles
3) breaking mutual forbearance and knowledge-sharing rules
4) hiding critical resources needed by another party
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5) misrepresenting a party’s own abilities
6) standing by unconcerned when another party or joint entity is suffering
7) withholding full effort and cooperation in an ongoing relationship
8) not adhering to explicit or implicit collective controls governing inter-party
exchange
9) reacting dishonestly to contractual renegotiations or change
10) making calculated efforts to confuse and manipulate information or incompletely
disclose information to another party
Hawkins, Pohlen, and Prybutok (2013) empirically investigate under what
circumstances buyers in buyer-supplier relationships engage in strong and weak forms
of opportunism. Their findings suggest that when the leader of a buyer’s team is
opportunistic in nature, engages in willful ignorance, and is characterized as dishonest,
then the buyer firm is more likely to engage in weak-form opportunism, but not the
strong-form opportunism. The authors argue that “under weak-form opportunism,
buyers may feel less accountable and susceptible to punishment” (p. 1273). This is in
accordance with the argument that weak-form opportunism is harder to detect since it
does not explicitly violate the contract (Luo 2006b). On other hand, the power
differential and competitiveness among partners cause buyers to engage in strong-form
opportunism, but not weak-form opportunism. This is in accordance with the proposition
that uncertainty due to bargaining asymmetry and competitiveness in the relationship is
likely to cause the presence of explicit contract violations (Luo 2006b).
All conceptual and empirical research investigating opportunism converges on
the fact that rogue-firm opportunism, regardless of the type, has serious consequences
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for interorganizational exchange (Luo 2006b); for example, it affects relationship
satisfaction (Seggie et al. 2013), financial and strategic performance (Gundlach and
Cannon 2010; Luo et al. 2007; Wathne and Heide 2000), and long-term collaboration
(Hawkins, Knipper, and Strutton 2009). This perspective is in line with game theory’s
mixed-motive social dilemma present in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Since the
prisoner’s dilemma game is closely related to relationships existent in the strategic
alliances (Parkhe 1993) and since this game’s basic arguments are driving most
hypotheses that follow in this dissertation, it is useful to review the game here.
Game theory researchers focus on studying factors that can influence levels of
opportunistic behavior between two or more parties. Various game types have been
investigated (e.g., single- vs. multiple-shot games, full- vs. partial-information available,
trust games, prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum game, social goods game, tit-for-tat, and
many others), but the most applicable game to strategic alliances is the prisoner’s
dilemma game. Experimental economists playing out the prisoner’s dilemma game and
its variants investigate how monitoring (Axelrod 2006), trust (Cox 2004), and social
identity (Chen and Chen 2011), among other factors, influence the utility function of
each party involved in the game. Thus, prisoner’s dilemma application of game theory is
very suitable to help explain how these factors affect rogue-firm and deviant-personal
opportunism in strategic alliances.
In the prisoner’s dilemma game, two players are imprisoned due to a suspicion
that they committed a crime. The two players are held in separate jail cells and are
unable to communicate with each other. Therefore, each is unaware whether the other
did not disclose information about the other’s involvement in the crime (i.e., cooperates
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with crime partner) or whether the other became a snitch (i.e., defects by acting
opportunistically). The authorities have sufficient evidence to convict both players on a
lesser charge. If neither player snitches, both will receive a small punishment for the
lesser charge. This is equivalent to mutual cooperation (MC). If one of the players
decides to snitch while the other remains quiet, the snitch will go free. This is equivalent
to unilateral opportunism (UO). Because of the snitch, the cooperative player will
receive a heavy sentence. This is equivalent to unilateral cooperation (UC). If both will
snitch, both will receive a moderate sentence. This is equivalent to mutual opportunism
(MO) (Parkhe 1993). These four scenarios are depicted in a 2 x 2 matrix in Figure 2.
In this game, the order of preferred outcome for each player is UO > MC > MO >
UC. Regardless of what the other player decides to do, each player will benefit more
from snitching than cooperating, because UO > MC and MO > UC. However, if both
players decide to snitch, both will receive a longer sentence than if both would
cooperate, because MC > MO. This is why the game is called the prisoner’s dilemma.

Player 1 (P1)
Sentence (P1; P2)
Opportunistic Behavior

Cooperative Behavior

Opportunistic Behavior

Mutual Opportunism (MO)
Sentence (moderate; moderate)

P1: Unilateral Cooperation (UC)
P2: Unilateral Opportunism (UO)
Sentence (high; go free)

Cooperative Behavior

P1: Unilateral Opportunism (UO)
P2: Unilateral Cooperation (UC)
Sentence (go free; high)

Mutual Cooperation (MC)
Sentence (low; low)

Player 2 (P2)

Figure 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
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Similarly, the dilemma exists in strategic alliances. On one side, partners to an
alliance are motivated to behave opportunistically because of what is known as
“learning races” (Kale et al. 2000). Learning races arise from the hidden motive driven
by partner-firms’ desire to gain access and internalize other partners’ know-how faster
than the other partners, hence the name learning races. If such opportunistic behavior is
unilateral (UO), then the alliance offers a higher return to the opportunistic party than
the cooperative alternative (MC) would offer. Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma assumption
that UO > MC is satisfied in a strategic alliances setting. However, on the other side of
the dilemma, alliance partners know that the partner may behave opportunistically as
well. Since both partner-firms are expected to behave opportunistically, then both will be
hesitant to contribute through cooperation. As a result, the alliance will fail to create
value and will be likely to dissolve – this would be an example of MO. Therefore, the MC
option starts to look more attractive to partner-firms, because MC > MO. In order to
resolve the dilemma in strategic alliances, partner-firms must decide on an effective
governance mode. In other words, partner-firms must evaluate the environment within
which the alliance exists and access which relational factors are likely to drive the
alliance to a prosperous future.
Ultimately, what the prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates is that opportunistic
behavior appears to be a safer and a more profitable option in the mixed-motive social
dilemma scenarios such as strategic alliances (Parkhe 1993). Therefore, opportunism is
to some degree always expected in strategic alliances. Opportunistic behavior creates
moral hazards (Williamson 1985) which must be preempted with partner monitoring
initiatives and/or building relational norms that can govern the exchange relationship.
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Whether the nature of the governance mode is more economic (e.g., monitoring),
relational (e.g., trust) or psychological (e.g., alliance identity), developing and
maintaining it increases transaction costs. Empirical research supports the notion that
rogue-firm opportunistic behavior increases transaction costs and, consequently,
damages outcomes of the partnership; for example, partner relationship satisfaction
(Seggie et al. 2013), financial and strategic performance (Gundlach and Cannon 2010;
Luo et al. 2007; Wathne and Heide 2000), and long-term collaboration (Hawkins et al.
2009). Thus, in line with the prisoner’s dilemma game and with the conceptual and
empirical works in strategic alliance research, it is hypothesized here that,

H1: Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with alliance
performance.

In summary, currently only two conceptually developed typologies of opportunism
exist in interorganizational relationships that are actively present in empirical research.
There is active and passive opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000) and there is strong
and weak opportunism (Luo 2006b) typology. Both Luo (2006b) and Wathne and Heide
(2000) acknowledge that opportunism is a complex phenomenon that deserves
additional attention and that future research should devote time to develop additional
typologies of opportunism. We must understand dimensionalities of opportunism before
we can further clarify some of the contradictory empirical findings in the literature.
Therefore, this dissertation addresses the plentiful examples of individual-level
opportunism in popular press, social psychology, and organizational behavior theories
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by differentiating between rogue-firm (firm-level) and deviant-personal (individual-level)
opportunistic behavior. The next section explores deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior.

Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior
Opportunistic behavior is also a problem at the individual alliance employee level.
This dissertation refers to individual-level misconduct as deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior. This naming is consistent with the study of deviant workplace behavior in
psychology and organizational behavior literature (Zagenczyk et al. 2011).
Deviant behavior is a real organizational threat. Literature reports that anywhere
between 33 to 75 percent of all employees engage in some form of deviant behavior
(Robinson and Bennett 1995), which is also evident from a national poll in which 48
percent of workers admitted to a behavior that was harmful to either their organization
or their co-workers (Litzky, Eddleston, and Kidder 2006). Not only is this a real threat,
but it is also a costly one. The financial losses stemming from deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior nationwide exceed $200 billion annually and cause 30 percent of
all business failures (Bolin and Heatherly 2001).
Robinson and Bennett (1995) define employee deviance as “voluntary behavior
that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well being of
an organization, its members, or both.” Other definitions are consistent with this one,
and often this definition is adopted verbatim (Bolin and Heatherly 2001; Litzky et al.
2006). This definition is merged with the definition of opportunistic behavior offered by
transaction costs economics to arrive at the definition of deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior used in this dissertation. Deviant-personal opportunistic behavior is defined
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here as an individual employee’s self-interest seeking through devious means that
threatens the well being of an alliance, its members, or both.
A seminal typology of deviant workplace behaviors is offered by Robinson and
Bennett (1995). The authors used multidimensional scaling technique to investigate
similarities across 45 different deviant behaviors. They found that deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior can be categorized along two dimensions. The first dimension is
concerned with the severity of the behavior. Its anchors are “minor” and “serious”
deviant behavior. The second dimension is concerned with who is being harmed by the
deviant behaviors. Its anchors are “organizational” and “interpersonal” deviant behavior.
These two dimensions together create four quadrants. The organizationalserious quadrant is labeled “property deviance” and includes behaviors such as
sabotaging R&D efforts, accepting kickbacks, lying, and stealing knowledge or
technologies from a company. The organizational-minor quadrant is labeled “production
deviance” and includes such behaviors as withholding effort, wasting resources, leaving
early, and taking excessive breaks. The interpersonal-serious quadrant is labeled
“personal aggression” and includes behaviors such as verbal abuse, stealing from coworkers, endangering co-workers, and even sexually harassing others. The
interpersonal-minor quadrant is labeled “political deviance” and includes behaviors such
as showing favoritism, gossiping, blaming others, and competing non-beneficially. While
deviant behaviors from all these quadrants may exist in an alliance setting, the most
damaging to the alliance outcomes are the behaviors from the two organizational
quadrants. These deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are likely to create distrust
among alliance partners because they can be perceived as aiming directly at the well-
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being of the offended partner firm. Thus, the partner may interpret deviant-personal
opportunism as rogue-firm opportunism. Consequently, due to deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior, the offending partner’s reputation will suffer.
An alliance partner-firm’s employees assigned to a newly formed alliance can
experience a role ambiguity. Among few other triggers, Litzky et al. (2006) point out that
role ambiguity could be a trigger of deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Role
ambiguity implies that an employee does not have an adequate level of information
about his or her new role. The lack of information creates a sense of uncertainty about
the expected behavior in the new role. Consequently, one’s job performance may suffer,
and employees may respond by behaving opportunistically in order to compensate for
the low job performance. The authors point out that role ambiguity can be especially
salient for employees who are in boundary-spanner roles. Partner firm employees
assigned to an alliance are in a boundary-spanner role where they are viewed as a
liaison between their firm and the partner firm.
The deviant-personal behavior of alliance employees can be either self-serving
or company-serving. For example, due to the stress from role ambiguity mentioned
above or simply due to the competitive nature of an employee, alliance employees are
likely to engage in self-serving deviant behavior that improves employees’ personal job
satisfaction, future job advancements, or plainly a behavior that integrates their job
more effectively with their lives. The self-serving deviant behavior is not specifically
targeted at one or the other alliance partner as long as the behavior results in personal
gain of sorts. Also stemming from the role ambiguity or the competitive nature,
employees may behave in a way that they think might be more satisfactory with the
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upper management’s expectations. However, because of the ambiguity, the
interpretation of what is expected may be misjudged, resulting in deviant behavior
towards one’s own firm or towards the other alliance partner-firm. One’s competitive
nature is more likely to result in deviant behavior against the other alliance partner-firm
in order to attempt to speedily satisfy upper management’s performance goals. In
summary, whether the deviant behavior is self-serving or targeted against one of the
alliance partners, ultimately such behavior can be viewed as a threat to one of the
partners. Consequently, such behavior is likely to be met with countermeasures in the
form of retaliation or increased costs due to the need to monitor more closely the
alliance employees.
The prisoner’s dilemma game explains deviant-personal opportunistic behavior
similarly to rogue-firm opportunistic behavior because it is conceptualized at both the
individual and group level. The offended partner in an alliance may view the deviantpersonal opportunistic behavior as a direct threat targeted at its firm. Therefore, as
game theory suggests, a defection by one player will be met with a defection of the
second player during the next move. Such retaliation in strategic alliances is
counterproductive to the alliance, and the outcomes of such retaliation result in loss of
profits, poor reputation, less likely future partnerships, increased transaction costs, or
even early termination of the alliance (Litzky et al. 2006). In any way, the performance
of the alliance suffers, thus:

H2: Deviant-personal opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with
alliance performance.
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Relational Factors
Controlling opportunistic behavior in a relationship between alliance partners can
take on a formal or an informal form (Carson et al. 2006). Formal control is represented
by often written contractual safeguards which are enforced by monitoring of exchange
partners, while informal control is represented by often unwritten relational contracts
and norms (Tiwana 2010). Relational contracts can exhibit themselves through trust or
identification with alliance partners. Both formal and relational contracting in strategic
alliance settings have proved to be valuable; however, relational contracting so far has
not received empirical inspection on par with the empirical inspection of formal
contracting (Carson et al. 2006). Moreover, three areas exist in strategic alliances
literature that call for more research. First, the majority of existing research has focused
on either formal or relational contracting, but not both. As a consequence, theory is
unclear whether the two interact or supplement each other (Tiwana 2010). This is
supported by the conceptual argument that “neither economic (e.g., monitoring) nor
social forces (e.g., relative alliance identity or trust) by themselves suffice in
suppressing opportunism; a mix of both will always be more operative and effective”
(Luo 2006a, p. 59). In the case of theory of marketing channel relationships, Stern and
Reve (1980) similarly criticize that fragmenting the exchange relationship theory into
rational economic-based and social behavioral-based arguments, without consideration
of their interactions, can produce only a limited knowledge of the phenomenon. Second,
organizational identity is practically non-existent in strategic alliances research or in
interfirm relationships in general, yet there are calls for incorporating this construct into
organizational boundaries and interfirm relationships (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).
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Third, each study about interfirm relationships is often guided by one isolated theory.
While there are good reasons to do so, such isolated perspectives also have limited
external validity and as a result have constrained the academic conversation about
phenomena related to strategic alliances (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). An empirical
response to the points above will contribute by offering an explanation of existing
contradictory findings in strategic alliances and interfirm relationships literature in
general.
For these reasons, three relationship factors are explored in this dissertation.
Specifically, the next section reviews existing literature about and related theories to
monitoring, relative alliance identity, and trust. Game theory is utilized throughout the
review because it is foundational to the three constructs and their relevant theories. The
main effects, the interactive effect between trust and monitoring, and their impact on
opportunistic behavior are explored as well.
Monitoring
Transaction cost economics (TCE) draws on the game theory-based argument
which suggests that monitoring of alliance partners should aid in suppressing
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). The prisoner’s dilemma game tells us that
monitoring allows an alliance partner to collect evidence of whether the other alliance
partner is going to cooperate. Lacking monitoring means lacking information about a
partner’s likelihood to cooperate; therefore, game theory rationale is for an alliance
partner to compete. In game theory terms, monitoring allows the game to be played
under the assumption of full information about other’s behaviors. More realistically,
monitoring attenuates information asymmetry between alliance partners (Eisenhardt
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1985). Either way, this argument suggests that monitoring creates conditions where
alliance partners can be more cooperative instead of competitive towards each other.
As a result, less opportunism exists in the relationship, and, consequently, the alliance
can be more profitable. While empirical research of monitoring effects is still relatively
scarce (Heide et al. 2007), some evidence of the positive side of monitoring exists in
marketing literature.
Definitions of monitoring differ slightly across disciplines and across contextual
differences of individual studies. However, in general monitoring can be defined as “an
effort made by one party to measure or meter the performance of another” (Heide et al.
2007). A representative set of definitions used across marketing, management, and
economics literature is presented in Table 6. In this dissertation, monitoring is defined
as procedures designed and incorporated within a strategic alliance relationship by one
party to acquire information and ascertain a partner’s activities and conduct – adapted
from Gundlach and Cannon (2010).
Since formal control is defined with respect to the level of monitoring between
two parties (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007), Anderson and Oliver (1987) draw on
formal control literature (Ouchi 1977) to introduce their conceptualization of outcomebased and behavior-based monitoring of sales personnel. Recently their typology was
adapted into interfirm relationships (Heide et al. 2007). In strategic alliances, an
outcome-based monitoring system (OBMS) can be defined as a monitoring system
involving measurements of the visible consequences of an alliance partner (Heide et al.
2007). These visible consequences can vary across alliances but often include some
form of measuring the timely delivery of a pre-specified objective, delivering accurately

44

on a given objective, and delivering an expected level of R&D quality. For example, an
alliance partner may monitor the quality of components produced by other partners that
are necessary to get closer to the ultimate R&D alliance goal of producing new
innovative products, technology, or knowledge. Under OBMS, individual partners are
left alone to choose how they go about delivering these components, and fairly little
direction for each partner is offered about how to achieve the outcomes that are
monitored (Anderson and Oliver 1987). Therefore, OBMS is focused on the alliance
goals, but it can miss partners’ behaviors that may not align with the monitoring
partner’s corporate mission statement as pertained to, for example, labor practices,
supplier relations, customer relations, etc.
Based on the TCE perspective, OBMS has been described as a market oriented
flat monitoring system, where competitive forces of the market determine survival
(Anderson and Oliver 1987; John and Weitz 1989). In a strategic alliance, if one partner
does not meet pre-specified objectives, and builds its reputation as being opportunistic,
future participation in potentially lucrative alliances with the same partner, or other firms,
will not be possible for the opportunistic firm. Thus, firms that can offer successful
outcomes by eliminating inefficient and unattractive processes on their own are more
likely to enjoy economic rents out of an alliance setting and participation in future
alliances based on their positive reputation of being able to deliver results. These future
partnership considerations are referred to in game theory as the “shadow of the future”
(Bó 2005; Heide and Miner 1992; Parkhe 1993). However, the need to deliver results no
matter what may originate from behaviors that are opportunistic in nature. Thus, there is
a need to monitor behaviors.
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Table 6. Definitions of Monitoring
Source

Construct Name

Definition

Ferrin et al. 2007

Monitoring

Behaviors conducted by one party to
gain information about another party’s
level of cooperation.

Heide et al. 2007

General
Monitoring

An effort made by one party to
measure or meter the performance of
another.

Heide et al. 2007

Output Monitoring

Measurement of the visible
consequences of a partner’s actions.

Heide et al. 2007

Behavior
Monitoring

Evaluation of the processes that are
expected to produce the focal
outcomes.

Gundlach and Cannon
2010

Monitoring

Procedures designed and
incorporated within an exchange
relationship by one party to acquire
information and ascertain a partner’s
activities and conduct.

A behavior-based monitoring system (BBMS) is defined as a monitoring system
involving evaluation of the processes that are expected by management to produce the
desired outcomes of a strategic alliance (Heide et al. 2007). Under BBMS, individual
partners of an alliance must regularly report to the alliance management about their
daily tasks and how they go about completing specified objectives. Alliance
management offers specific direction for each partner and monitors each partner’s
actions and behaviors along the way. For example, under BBMS an alliance partner can
monitor other partners by inspecting their production facilities, question their internal
business practices, or monitor closely their interactions with potential customers of the
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upcoming new product, technology, or knowledge that is likely to result from an alliance.
Therefore, BBMS can help partner-firms maintain their corporate mission statement
standards by monitoring specific behaviors of other partners. This extensive behaviorbased monitoring may, however, un-purposefully cause loss of focus on the outcomes
of R&D alliance.
According to TCE, BBMS is suspect due to the attempt to substitute outcomebased with behavior-based performance signals (Anderson and Oliver 1987). BBMS
may be viewed as a command-based hierarchical type of control system. Williamson
(1981) questions management’s motives behind attempts to directly control individual
behaviors rather than choosing more objective control measures. He states that such
management has egoistic motives instead of desire for the behavior controls to truly
provide higher performance. Thus, BBMS may be viewed as opportunistic in nature and
cause negative perception of the monitoring by the monitored alliance partner.
The two monitoring systems are an extreme example of a continuum (Oliver and
Anderson 1995). Both have advantages and disadvantages that must be carefully
considered. BBMS is very qualitative in nature, which can translate into subjective
evaluations. The hierarchical aspect of BBMS can quickly become too complex and
create organizational paralysis. BBMS can, however, be very valuable when uncertainty
among alliance partners exists. Under uncertain conditions, outcomes may be unknown
and thus not possible to measure. Therefore, OBMS can be a dangerous option under
uncertain conditions. Consequently, alliance partners may behave opportunistically
under uncertain conditions without BBMS. On the positive side, OBMS is much more
objective in nature and tends to be a less expensive monitoring option that is based on
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“survival of the fittest” market oriented principle. Due to these advantages and
disadvantages of both monitoring systems, a hybrid monitoring system may offer higher
performance outcomes (Oliver and Anderson 1995). Therefore, attempting to maximize
one or the other may result in an inferior performance when compared to finding an
optimal point between the two. Hence, it is suggested that the focus should be on
optimization of the two rather than maximization of one or the other monitoring system
(Oliver and Anderson 1995).
In their study, Heide et al. (2007) investigate the effects of monitoring on
opportunistic behavior in the interfirm relationship between buyers and suppliers in a
building material product category. They find that the effects differ across form of
monitoring and based on the context in which monitoring takes place. For the form of
monitoring, they consider output and behavior monitoring (Anderson and Oliver 1987).
They find that output monitoring decreases opportunism and behavior monitoring
increases opportunism. They built their reasoning based on TCE and reactance
theories. As stated earlier, output based monitoring is cheaper to implement and a less
obtrusive form of monitoring. The opposite is true for behavior monitoring. The
monitoring partner has to spend more time, effort, and finances to implement behavior
monitoring, and the monitored party perceives such efforts as detrimental to its
autonomy and self-controlling entity. Hence, opportunistic behavior increases under
behavior monitoring.
Their study has certain limitations, however. First, they assume that output and
behavior monitoring is an “either / or” choice, which contradicts with the
conceptualization and empirical work of the original authors of the monitoring typology
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(Anderson and Oliver 1987; Oliver and Anderson 1995). The original authors point out
that both types are often used by any given organization and that future research should
focus on finding an optimal point between the two (i.e., optimal ratio) rather than which
one is the better or worse option. Second, their study is limited to a very specific product
category; thus, their generalizability suffers. The third point is not a limitation per se, but
it is important to this dissertation. The authors examine supplier-buyer relationships
which have been shown to behave differently from strategic alliances. Thus, their
research is informative, but may not generalize into strategic alliances literature.
In their examination of buyer-supplier relationships, Gundlach and Cannon
(2010) examine whether verification strategies positively impact partners’ performance.
They conceptualize verification strategies as monitoring, assurance, and corroboration.
Assurance is operationalized as information exchange (e.g., sharing proprietary
knowledge, joint planning and sharing costs, supply and demand information), and
corroboration pertains to actively monitoring the external market. The most relevant
dimension of their verification strategies to this dissertation is monitoring. They
operationalize monitoring as formal supplier evaluations through “formal collection of
information on product quality, delivery, price, support services, etc., through inspection
and evaluation processes” (Gundlach and Cannon 2010, p. 404). Their logic behind
their hypothesis is based on TCE. Specifically, they argue that monitoring allows the
monitoring partner to make sure that the monitored partner performs as expected and
does not deviate from cooperative behavior. However, they do not find support for their
positive relationship hypothesis. This lack of support may suggest that monitoring may
interact with other relationship factors; thus, research should consider what these
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factors may be. Later sections of this chapter will address the possibility of interaction
between monitoring and trust.
In summary, game theory and TCE arguments suggest that monitoring can
attenuate information asymmetries between alliance partners and therefore lower
opportunistic behavior. Also, the continuum between outcome-based and behaviorbased monitoring suggests that some optimal point between the two types of monitoring
produces more favorable partner behaviors. This point is incorporated into the adapted
monitoring scale used in this dissertation. Therefore, it is hypothesized here that:

H3: Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors.

H4: Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors.

Trust
Trust is an important construct in exchange relationships that influences the
behaviors of the partners. Many studies incorporate trust into their conceptual models,
yet the precise effects of trust are still not known (Gundlach and Cannon 2010). It is an
intricate and elusive construct that is presented in literature with various definitions and
dimensionalities. Thus, before investigating the effects of trust on opportunistic
behaviors of an alliance, a conceptual review of trust is appropriate here.
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Gulati (1995) differentiates between knowledge-based trust and deterrencebased trust. He conceptualizes knowledge-based trust based on previous business
experience between two alliance partners. If two partners have had previous business
engagements, they have likely learned how trustworthy the other party is. Thus, each
party developed knowledge about the other’s trustworthiness. Deterrence-based trust is
conceptualized based on utilitarian considerations. The expectations of sanctions if one
misbehaves can be costly to an alliance partner. The costs are loss of repeat business
with the same partner and hindered reputation other market actors allocate to the
misbehaved firm, which consequently can create long-term costs of transacting with
future potential alliance partners (i.e., game theory’s “shadow of the future” mentioned
previously).
In their conceptual paper about trust and control in strategic alliances, Das and
Teng (2001) differentiate between competence trust and goodwill trust. They view
competence trust as “the expectation of technically competent role performance” (Das
and Teng 2001, p. 256). This expectation can be based on an alliance partner’s
demonstrated ability or expertise. The conceptualization is similar to knowledge-based
trust (Gulati 1995). Goodwill trust refers to “the expectation that some others in our
social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special
concern for other’s interest above their own” (Das and Teng 2001, p. 256).
Williamson (1993) distinguishes between calculative trust and personal trust.
Calculative trust, similarly to deterrence-based trust (Gulati 1995), occurs when the
trustor chooses to entrust the trustee on the basis of an anticipated utility calculation.
Personal trust, similarly to knowledge-based (Gulati 1995) and goodwill (Das and Teng
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2001) trust, is based on the trustor’s feeling and belief that entrusting the trustee is the
right choice.
While dimensionalities of trust have been suggested, at the aggregate level, trust
refers to trustor’s expectancy of reciprocal behavior of the trustee where a payoff comes
for something done or given (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). The definitions of
trust vary across studies. However, at the core of each definition is the belief that the
other party in a relationship will do as promised or as expected. Therefore, trust is
defined here as the perceived credibility that the alliance partner will behave in the best
interest of the exchange relationship. Representative definitions of trust from across
disciplines are listed in Table 7.
Trust as an antecedent to relational behaviors has consistently been found to be
an important factor in relationship marketing literature. However, trust has a bright and a
dark side. On the bright side, trust has been shown to be an important relational
mechanism. For example, Hewett and Bearden (2001) investigate how multinational
corporations (MNCs) manage their global marketing operations. They find that trust
between the headquarters of a MNC and its foreign subsidiaries enhances cooperation
among the two units and consequently improves performance of the whole organization.
In their empirical investigation of new product alliances, Rindfleisch and
Moorman (2001) find support for the hypothesis that relational embeddedness will be
positively related to information utilization in new product alliances in the form of new
product creativity and new product development speed. They argue that under
conditions of relational embeddedness, partners experience higher levels of trust. As a
result of trust, there is a higher level of commitment between partners (Morgan and
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Hunt 1994), which lowers opportunism. Under a smaller possibility of opportunistic
behavior, information can be utilized more effectively. Similar arguments are presented
by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande (1992), who find that embedded relations
between marketing research firms and their customers improve utilization of the
marketing research information generated by the marketing research firms. They
operationalize embedded relations in terms of organizational trust.
Şengün and Wasti (2007) test some of the propositions offered by Das and
Teng’s (2001) conceptual framework of trust, control and risk in strategic alliances. In
their investigation of pharmaceutical buyer-supplier relationships, the authors find
empirical support that goodwill trust is positively related with willingness to take a
performance risk. Same cannot be said about competence trust. They operationalize
performance risk in terms of delays in payments and delays in order delivery. They
justify their finding by stating that goodwill trust is based on the trustor’s perception of
the trustee’s willingness to return a “favor in tight situations.” Therefore, while one might
have the ability (i.e., competence) to deliver or pay on time, it does not mean that one is
willing to offer that competence because other goodwill or relational ties take
precedence. Hence, the definition used here does not necessarily consider an alliance
partner’s ability, but instead focuses on the credibility or expectation that one can be
trusted to not behave against expectations. Relationship marketing theory (Morgan and
Hunt 1994) proposes that trust is one of the key antecedents to cooperative behaviors
and performance outcomes of an exchange relationship; however, more recent
literature suggests that there may be a negative side to trust in an exchange.
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Table 7. Definitions of Trust
Source

Construct Name

Definition

Gulati 1995

Trust

A type of expectation that alleviates the
fear that one’s exchange partner will act
opportunistically.

Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995

Trust

The willingness of a party to be
vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other
will perform a particular action important
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control that other party.

Nooteboom, Berger,
and Noorderhaven
1997

Trust

Belief or confidence about another party’s
integrity (including reliability, predictability,
and dependability) and/or benevolence
(including goodwill, motives, intentions,
and caring).

Zaheer, McEvily, and
Perrone 1998

Trust

The expectation that an actor (1) can be
relied on to fulfill obligations, (2) will
behave in a predictable manner, and (3)
will act and negotiate fairly when the
possibility for opportunism is present.

Geyskens,
Steenkamp, and
Kumar 1998

Trust

The extent to which a firm believes that its
exchange partner is honest and/or
benevolent.

Hewett and Bearden
2001

Trust

The perceived credibility and
benevolence of a target of trust.

Sarkar et al. 2001

Mutual Trust

The degree of confidence shared by
partners regarding each other’s integrity.

Krishnan et al. 2006

Interorganizational
Trust

The expectation held by one firm that
another will not exploit its vulnerabilities
when faced with the opportunity to do so.
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In their examination of interactive effects between trust and verification strategies
in supplier-buyer relationships, Gundlach and Cannon (2010) point out the dilemma of
trust, which suggests that trust in an exchange partner can also have a dark side. The
logic behind the dilemma of trust lies in the realization that trust can be abused. A
trusted party to an exchange may justify to itself that behaving opportunistically will not
necessarily be viewed by the trustor as a mischievous undertaking since the
relationship is built on trust. Gundlach and Cannon’s (2010) empirical findings suggest
that to achieve higher performance outcomes under high levels of trust, it can be
beneficial for the trustor to incorporate some verification strategies. Specifically, they
find that frequent information sharing and monitoring of the external market can limit an
exchange partner’s exposure to the dark side of trust. However, they do not find support
for their substitutive interactive effect between trust and monitoring of a partner,
suggesting that monitoring of partners and trust are complementary instead (this
interaction is explored in a later section).
Anderson and Jap (2005) offer a review of several cases of failed supplierbuyer exchange relationships. They conclude that many of these failed relationships
initially benefited from trust; however, at a certain point trust became the culprit behind
their failures. They state that “the very factors [trusted & close relationships] that make
partnerships with customers or suppliers beneficial can leave those relationships
vulnerable to deterioration” (p. 75). Furthermore, they conclude that trust allowed the
entrusted suppliers in the relationships to “systematically cheat their clients on an
ongoing basis” (p. 77). The business cases reviewed clearly present that the initial
benefits of trust-based relationships change into trust-abusing relationships. One of their
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examples is especially telling. A supplier of auto parts developed a very close
relationship with its automaker customer. They built trust with the customer by
encouraging its employees to go to dinners, play football, and go to other social events
with employees from the automaker firm. Once trust was established, the purchasing
department eased up on its total quality management practices. As a result, the supplier
started to cut its production costs by eliminating one of three coats of paint. The cost
savings were not shared with the customer. “In this manner, the trust, social
relationships and investments that were developed to make the relationship successful
became the doorway to the dark side” (Anderson and Jap 2005, p. 77). In trust-based
relationships, partners have a better chance of getting away with opportunistic behavior
(Selnes and Sallis 2003). This view is supported by Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002) who
caution that empirical evidence fails to support the positive relationship between trust
and performance and caution that “trust may be in danger of being oversold and
inappropriately used in practice” (p. 62).
From the game theory perspective, trust “facilitates cooperation because a party
who believes the partner is trustworthy will develop a higher willingness to risk, and
therefore in conditions of risk, the party is more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior”
(Ferrin et al. 2007, p. 474). In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the riskier but more
profitable option is for parties to cooperate. With trust, one is more likely to engage in
the riskier proposition due to the belief that the other party will choose to cooperate.
This basic idea is also reflected in social exchange theory, where trust is an important
relational mechanism that encourages future exchange in a relationship (Morgan and
Hunt 1994).
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Unlike social exchange theory, game theory goes beyond the bright side of trust
and offers an explanation why trust has a curvilinear effect on opportunistic behavior.
Game theoreticians consider the trust game theory to explain the curvilinear
relationship. The trust game is a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game and is played
as follows. There are two parties to a game; one is called the trustor and the other
trustee. Both receive some set dollar amount at the beginning of the game. For an
example, consider Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004), who started each party with a
$.40 amount. The trustor then has to make a decision to send his $.40 to the trustee or
to keep all the money. If he keeps the money, the game ends. If he decides to send the
money, then the trustee receives $.80 (double the $.40 to indicate benefit of
cooperation). The trustee then has to make a decision to send $.60 (half of his current
$1.20) back to the trustor, or he can decide to keep all the money. If the trustee keeps
all, the game ends. If the trustee decides to send $.60 back to the trustor, the game
goes to a second round. This is isomorphic to a strategic alliances setting where firms
have to make a decision whether to disclose know-how, make alliance specific
investments, or to sacrifice some other exposure in hopes to make the outcome of an
alliance more profitable than an outcome of working individually (this is the doubling of
$.40 effect).
The trust game can be a single-shot game, in which case it is almost identical to
classical prisoner’s dilemma game. However, the trust game can also consist of several
rounds. Therefore, trust games are often set up with a certain termination rule, which
suggests the expected length of the game. Generally, three decision rules are used in
the prisoner’s dilemma-like games (Normann and Wallace 2012). Specifically, the
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termination rules are (1) finite horizon – parties here are aware that the game has a
finite number of repetitions; (2) unknown horizon – participants do not know the number
of rounds in the game; and (3) random-stopping rule – participants are made aware that
each round comes with some probability of game termination. Most often termination
probability used is 0.2, or 20 percent.
Normann and Wallace (2012) find that in social dilemma settings (e.g., strategic
alliances), the termination rule does not have a significant effect on average cooperation
rates. In other words, on average the same level of opportunistic acts exists across the
three termination rules. However, they also find that cooperation over time is affected by
the termination rule. Specifically, a known finite horizon and a random-stopping rule with
high termination probability reveal negative time trend when it comes to cooperation.
This is suggestive of the curvilinear effect of trust on cooperation, where exchange
relationships initially benefit from trust-based exchanges; however, over time trust
becomes the culprit behind opportunistic acts. This is likely due to both parties’ endgame strategies clearly present in the prisoner’s dilemma game where the equilibrium
exists in the scenario of both parties defecting. Thus, trust initially helps parties
overcome the worry of end-game strategy, but ultimately, such strategies take over and
the relationship moves to the equilibrium.
Similarly, Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) investigate how experience (i.e.,
repeated supergame) in a trust game affects levels of trust. They consider finite and
random-stopping termination rules. They find that the level of trust is the same between
the two termination rules when parties to the exchange are inexperienced (i.e., first time
playing the game). However, as the two parties gain experience, the level of trust
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decreases in the finite horizon game, but does not decrease in the random-stopping
horizon game. Moreover, they find that regardless of experience or termination rule,
trust level declines over rounds of a game, but it resets when new relationships begin.
These findings again point to the curvilinear conceptualization of the relationship
between trust and opportunistic behavior. In early stages of the game, trust establishes
cooperation, but as the relationship matures, trust is misused towards one’s selfinterest.

H5: Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most effective
at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior.

H6: Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most effective
at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.

Relative Alliance Identity
Organizational identity has a rich history in academic literature. Yet, the construct
is not often considered in interorganizational research and is non-existent in strategic
alliances. Recently, scholars started to call on researchers to consider this construct in
organizational boundaries settings such as strategic alliances (Alvesson et al. 2008;
Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). Alvesson et al. (2008) argue that “the turn to identity
could be regarded as a source of revitalization for existing research areas, novel in that
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it continues establishing lines of inquiry by different means” (p. 6). Moreover,
organizational identity is regarded as superior to some other theoretical explanations of
competition and opportunism (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). Therefore, organizational
identity is incorporated into this dissertation, and it is argued that alliances that enjoy
higher levels of relative alliance identity will also enjoy lower levels of rogue-firm and
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors.
An individual’s identity within a group affects the individual psychologically and
behaviorally. From the psychology perspective, group identity helps one to answer the
question “Who am I?” This is possible because one’s self-image is defined by
membership to a certain group (Tajfel 1982). From the behavioral perspective, group
identity helps one to answer the question “How should I act?” Once an individual
reaches some level of self-identity, then the individual strives to maintain that identity.
To maintain their identity, individuals start to behave in ways advocated by the social
group with which they identify. It is this behavioral dimension that makes social identity
important to organizational studies because organizational identity can influence
intergroup opportunistic behavior, conflict, and cooperation (Ashforth and Mael 1989) in
a way to maintain a positive identity of self. However, employees can belong to various
groups within an organization (Tajfel and Turner 1979), such as marketing, engineering,
sales, organizational committee membership, level of management, etc. Similarly,
alliance employees can identify with their respective firm or with the alliance. For this
reason, capturing relative alliance identity as opposed to just alliance identity is a more
precise measure of how significant an employee’s alliance identity truly is. Fisher, Maltz,
and Jaworski (1997) made similar arguments at the functional level within an
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organization. Therefore, their definition is adapted here to define relative alliance
identity as the extent to which alliance managers feel a sense of connection with the
alliance rather than with their respective alliance partner-firm. Definitions related to
organizational identity are presented in Table 8.
Marketing literature utilizes the social identity theory in a variety of domains. In
the sales management literature, Wieseke et al. (2012) explore how salespeople’s
identification with their work team versus identification with the organization influences
their stereotypes towards the headquarters. Their findings suggest that work team
identification cultivates negative stereotyping towards the headquarters more strongly
when organizational identity is low. Furthermore, they show that through headquarters
stereotypes, team work identification mixed with low organizational identification
indirectly impacts sales performance of the sales force. Since negative stereotypes
inhibit positive behavior (Ashforth and Mael 1989), together their results show that
identification can influence organizational behavior.
Social identity has also been applied in cross-functional research in marketing.
Often seen problem in organizations is the communication difficulty between marketing
and engineering function. Fisher et al. (1997) offer two factors affecting productive
communication behaviors between the two functions. The first is information-sharing
norms defined as “organizational guidelines and expectation that foster the free
exchange of information between functions” (p. 56). These norms dictate how
organizational members should communicate across functions. However, the authors
find that in the marketing-engineering interactions, the norms work only in the case
where employees identify less with their respective functional area than with the
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organization. They find that when employees have high “relative functional
identification,” then the effect of organizational norms is muted. The second factor
affecting communication behaviors of these two functions are goals that are integrated
across the functions. Integrated goals are “superordinate to the interests of individuals
… because the achievement of each person is facilitated by the achievement of others”
(p. 57). Therefore, in the case of high relative functional identity, integrated goals are a
more suitable way to promote productive communication behavior than informationsharing norms. Furthermore, the authors show that productive communication behavior
leads to positive communication outcomes. Similarly, the conceptual model of this
dissertation suggests that opportunistic behavior will have negative consequences on
performance outcomes.
Within the marketing ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature,
Martin et al. (2011) position organizational identity as the mechanism driving responses
to institutional pressures and marketing ethics initiatives. They differentiate between
authentic and calculative ethical identity. Calculative ethical identity is driven by external
motivation to respond to pressures from the market. Such external motives are often
viewed by consumers as “greenwashing” and can have a detrimental impact on firm
performance. Authentic ethical identity is driven by internal motivation of the
organization to do practice in a socially responsible way. Through experimental game
theory modeling, the authors show that authentic ethical identity has a more beneficial
impact on performance outcomes than does calculative ethical identity. The construct of
relative alliance identity is more synonymous with the authentic ethical identity.
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Table 8. Definitions Related to Relative Alliance Identity
Source

Construct Name

Definition

Fisher et al. 1997

Relative
functional
identification

The extent to which managers feel a
sense of connection with their function
compared with the organization as a
whole.

Peteraf and Shanley 1997

Strategic group
identity

A set of mutual understandings,
among members of a cognitive
intraindustry group, regarding the
central, enduring, and distinctive
characteristics of the group.

Haslam 2004

Social
identification

A relatively enduring state that reflects
an individual’s readiness to define
him- or herself as a member of a
particular social group.

Homburg, Wieseke, and
Hoyer 2009

Customer- and
Employeecompany
identification

The degree to which customers and
employees, respectively, identify with
a company to fulfill self-definitional
needs and the resultant emotional
reactions to this identification.

Wieseke et al. 2009

Organizational
identification

A process in which leaders instill into
followers a sense of oneness with the
organization.

Martin, Johnson, and
French 2011

Authentic ethical
identity

Institutional norm adherence due to
internal motivations.

Calculative ethical Institutional norm adherence due to
identity
external motivations.
Wieseke et al. 2012

Social
identification

The process by which a group
becomes directly linked to its
members’ sense of self.
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Zaheer et al. (1998) investigate supplier-buyer relationships within an electrical
manufacturing industry. They find that trust negatively impacts costs of negotiation
between partners to the exchange. They argue that negotiations costs decrease when
trust exists between partners, because contracts can be written and agreements can be
reached more quickly as partners are able to readily arrive at a “meeting of the minds.”
They argue that the meeting of the minds is possible thanks to a high level of trust.
However, it can be argued that their proposition is incorrectly attributed to trust. A
meeting of the minds suggests that two parties are closer to being “one” or, in other
words, more closely identify with each other. Thus, their conceptualization more closely
matches the idea that if two alliance partners can identify relatively more with the
alliance than with their own firm, then the alliance is likely to enjoy lower negotiation
costs. However, they failed to operationalize meeting of the minds as identity, thus
further analysis is warranted.
Organizational identity has been explored in other marketing domains as well.
For example, Homburg et al. (2009) find that employee-company identification
influences customer-company identification, which ultimately impacts customer loyalty
and willingness to pay. Their empirical finding suggests that this path explains loyalty
and willingness to pay beyond the more established employee job satisfaction-customer
satisfaction path. Organizational identity also influences internal marketing. Wieseke et
al. (2009) find that employees’ organizational identification (OI) is stronger whenever
their leaders’ OI is stronger. Moreover, they find that employees’ OI improves their
performance, and when the leader and the employees have strong OI, their business
unit enjoys greater financial performance. Taken together, all the marketing studies
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presented here suggest that organizational identity influences organizational members’
behavior positively and consequently improves a firm’s performance.
Differences between identity and seemingly related constructs. Some may see
the relationship marketing literature synonymous with social identity literature. While a
majority of scholars have come to a conclusion that the two, in fact, offer distinct
perspectives on organizational studies, it is useful to address the concern. Identification
with a group can exist even in the absence of interpersonal cohesion, similarity, or
interaction. The absence of the relational factors (e.g., trust) does not change the fact
that social identification (e.g., relative alliance identity) impacts affect and behavior. A
series of laboratory experiments proved that in-group favoritism occurs even without
interaction with in-group members or with other out-groups (Tajfel 1982). Explicit
random assignment of participants into groups leads to discrimination against outgroups and enhanced cooperation between members of an in-group (Locksley et al.
1980). Social identity is a psychological phenomenon. Members of an in-group “credit
the group with a psychological reality apart from their relationships with its members”
(Ashforth and Mael 1989, p. 24). Ultimately, relational factors such as trust don’t have to
be present to have an identity.
Similarly, Homburg et al. (2009) offer conceptual differentiation between
customer-company identification and customer commitment. They point out that
identification “includes both self-definitional and an emotional meaning for a person”
(p.42). Commitment does not cover the psychological oneness and self-definition. A
customer may be committed to purchasing a company’s product because he or she
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does not have any other alternative, but that does not necessarily mean that the
customer identifies with a firm.
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005, p. 502) conceptually argue that organizational
“identity often dominates” other more established perspectives about organizational
boundaries. It is argued here that alliances that are able of reshaping the boundaries of
their partners such that the bordering partner boundary weakens, while the outer
boundary of the alliance strengthens, will experience a decreased level of both roguefirm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. From a game theory point of view,
such reshaping of a boundary creates “identity costs” (Uzea and Fulton 2009) which
hurt parties that choose to defect (i.e., be opportunistic) from the prisoner’s dilemma
game (i.e., the alliance). The authors find that breaking away from the strategic group
negatively affects the break-away party’s utility. In other words, if an alliance partner
behaves opportunistically against the alliance, not only will this partner incur economic
costs, but also identity costs. This happens because, for a partner who highly identifies
with an alliance, opportunistic behavior is incompatible with the partner’s identity. In
turn, the possibility of these utility costs (identity costs) deters a party’s incentive to
swerve from the in-group norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
Additionally to the prisoner’s dilemma game, social identity proves to have a
positive effect on cooperative behaviors in a variety of game types. For example, low
group identity leads to an inefficient equilibrium solution in a minimum effort game
(Chen and Chen 2011); in a repeated-play public goods game, a team identity limits
shirking and free-riding behavior (Eckel and Grossman 2005); and in bargaining games
group identity builds negative out-group opinions which in turn reinforce in-group identity
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and consequently improve cooperative behavior among in-group members (McLeish
and Oxoby 2007). Considering the game-theoretic and social identity theory (SIT)
perspectives, intra-organizational empirical support, and experimental economics
support, it is hypothesized here:

H7: Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior.

H8: Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm
opportunistic behavior.

Interactive Effect between Trust and Monitoring
Gundlach and Cannon (2010) hypothesize that the positive effect of verification
strategies on performance is weaker at higher levels of trust. They operationalize
verification strategies as a three-dimensional construct that includes (1) monitoring of
exchange partners, (2) monitoring the external market, and (3) presence of a certain
level of information exchange between partners. The most relevant to this study is the
first dimension. Specifically, with this dimension they argue that if one party has trust in
another, then there is no need to monitor the trusted party as much. Their hypothesis is
based on the logic that monitoring and trust are two substitutive interfirm control
mechanisms, hence the expected negative interaction. However, their empirical findings
do not support this hypothesis, thus suggesting that the two constructs may be
complementary rather than substitutive in nature. The argument for complementary
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interaction is supported by the proposition that “in strategic alliances the trust level will
exert a moderating effect in a manner so that control mechanisms will achieve a greater
level of control in high-trust situations than in low-trust situations” (Das and Teng 1998,
p. 503). Similarly, Carson et al. (2006) conclude that formal (i.e., monitoring) and
relational contracts (i.e., trust) are not simply substitutive. Game theory also offers a
logical explanation of why the interaction between trust and monitoring is of a
complementary rather than a substitutive nature.
In the investment game, which is based on the trust game, player A is given $10.
Player A is then given an option to keep the $10 or send some amount between $0 and
$10 to a player B who is located in a separate room. Player A is also told that whatever
amount he or she sends to player B will automatically triple even before getting to player
B. Player B is not aware of the tripling effect. Player B is then given an option to either
keep all the money or send some amount back. Just like in the prisoner’s dilemma
game, the Nash equilibrium would suggest that player A should act opportunistically and
not send any money to player B. However, results of this experiment suggest that
people will send on average $5.16 to an unknown counterpart in another room trusting
that the person will reciprocate and send at least some money back (Berg et al. 1995).
In this game, player A does not know player B, does not know the average amount sent
by other participants, and does not know the probability of player B sending some
amount back. Thus, player A’s decision is solely based on trust and belief that player B
will reciprocate cooperatively.
The fact that on average players A send out $5.16 to players B is suggestive of a
curvilinear effect between trust and cooperation. If player A would have no trust in
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player B, then player A would not send any money. Sending out the whole $10 would be
suggestive of maximum trust. The fact that the average of $5.16 is right in the middle of
the range is indicative of people’s wanting to trust others but being cautious at the same
time. In other words, people don’t mind trusting others but at the same time would like to
verify others’ credibility before engaging in more involved cooperative decisions. If
information asymmetries would be lowered through monitoring, then that would suggest
to player A that he or she can expect an increased level of reciprocity from player B.
Consequently, the average amount sent by player A would increase under scenarios of
having close to full information about the expected behavior of player B (Berg et al.
1995). This logic lands support for complementary interactive effect between trust and
monitoring being superior to a main effect of one or the other. Formally,

H9: The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.

H10: The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm
opportunistic behavior beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.

Alliance Partner Stability
The internal environment of an alliance, in other words, the relationship stability
between two partners, determines the degree of trust, monitoring, and relative alliance
identity present between alliance partners. In general, the alliance partner stability is the
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degree of stability among factors related to the internal alliance environment as
presented by the presence of organizational proximity and presence of partner
independence (adapted from Luo 2006b). Alliance partner stability exists under low
organizational distance (i.e., organizational proximity) and low dependence on the
alliance partner (i.e., independence). Effects of alliance partner stability on the three
relational factors (trust, monitoring, and relative alliance identity) are discussed next.
Impact on Monitoring
Lack of stability between alliance partners creates uncertainties that require
alliance partners to acquire more information about the environment they operate in to
keep the transaction costs down (Luo 2006b). From a game theory perspective, stability
is necessary to keep the parties from misbehaving towards each other. Therefore, in the
absence of stable conditions, more control is required by incorporating monitoring
efforts into the exchange relationship.
Game theory suggests that in strategic alliances the risk arises from unilaterally
losing core proprietary know-how to the partner. Alliances are burdened with the hidden
motives driven by partner-firms’ desire to gain access and internalize other partners’
know-how faster than the other partners. This phenomenon is known as “learning races”
(Kale et al. 2000). Learning races are intensified when interpartner competition is high,
because the party that can learn and absorb knowledge faster can also respond faster
and more effectively to the competitive nature of its partner. As a result, alliance
partner-firms are prone to increase their monitoring efforts when interpartner
competition is high.
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Furthermore, horizontal alliances experience more competition among alliance
partners then vertical alliances (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). As a result of
competitive forces among partners, alliance partners must increase their monitoring
efforts (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003) despite the findings that such increased
monitoring efforts may damage customer orientation (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003)
or increase the possibility of marketing warfare among partners (Luo et al. 2007) – a
closely related concept to the learning races mentioned above. While competition is
clearly stronger in horizontal alliances, it can also exist in vertical alliances. Suppliers
create alliances with downstream partners who do not offer significant market share, but
can offer know-how that may be beneficial to other downstream partners outside of the
focal alliance; this is another illustration of the learning races concept in strategic
alliances. Taken together, stable conditions where interpartner competition is not
present would lower the need to monitor alliance partners because there is no sense of
urgency to collect more information about the partner.
It is well established in strategic alliances literature that similar organizational
cultures create more certain and predictive conditions between alliance partners (Choi
and Lee 1997; Simonin 1999). Such stable conditions result in higher levels of
knowledge transfer, which is critical to productive cooperative relationships.
Consequently, alliance partners don’t have a reason to monitor their alliance partners.
On other hand, if organizational differences exist, such differences create internal
struggles due to alliance partner firms’ differing management styles, marketing
practices, and difficult inter-firm communication. Lu and Beamish (2004) find that
international alliance partners experience increased levels of “coordination costs.” Their
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argument is based on differing organizational and national cultures. Moreover, Sirmon
and Lane (2004) argue that in international joint ventures it is the organizational culture
differences that impact the joint venture performance more than national culture.
Overwhelmingly, existing literature supports the idea that organizational distance
between business partners results in increased levels of partner monitoring.
In summary, alliance partner stability decreases the need to monitor alliance
partners, because stable conditions – lack of competitiveness between partners,
organizational proximity, and partner independence – do not require heightened
alertness in the form of increased levels of partner monitoring. Stated formally:

H11: Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring.

Impact on Trust
Prior alliance research suggests that firms in competitor-dominated alliances
display lower levels of mutual trust than firms in channel-dominated alliances (Bucklin
and Sengupta 1993). This weakened level of trust arises from firms in competitordominated alliances facing a higher potential for opportunism that is present due to the
competitive forces existent among partners of a competitor-dominated alliance
(Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003). The competitive forces among alliance partners signal
threats to the alliance that create unstable conditions in the relationship.
As stated previously, working with alliance partners that have different
organizational cultures creates liabilities due to coordination costs (Lu and Beamish
2004). Different cultural norms and values dictate different social relations norms.
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Literature recognizes several categories of organizational cultures. The most often cited
are clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy (Moorman 1995). Similarly to national
cultures, the more collectivistic cultures are expected to act more cooperatively then
individualistic cultures, and some cultures tolerate more uncertainty and instability than
others (Hofstede 1980). It is easier to rely on trust in collectivistic cultures because by
definition one can expect more relational types of behaviors. On other side, trust may be
harder to come by in individualistic countries.
In his seminal work about alliance partner familiarity and trust, Gulati (1995) finds
empirical support for the hypothesis that familiarity with an alliance partner improves
trust. In other words, partnering with a partner who has a proven record improves trust,
because the proven record creates stable conditions within which the relationship can
flourish. Stated formally:

H12: Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust.

Impact on Relative Alliance Identity
Social identity theory maintains that the motives behind one’s identification with a
certain social group can be due to the desire to achieve self-enhancement (Tajfel and
Turner 1979), but also due to desire to reduce social uncertainty (Grieve and Hogg
1999). Uncertainty identity theory, an extension of SIT, suggests that one’s identification
with a social group (i.e., a strategic alliance) can be a direct response to perceived
uncertainty from the social context (Hogg 2000). Similarly, game theory states that the
magnitude of the identity costs depends on the context salience (Akerlof and Kranton
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2000; Uzea and Fulton 2009). This suggests that salience of any instability between
partners influences the magnitude of identity costs. In the context of this dissertation,
lack of alliance partner stability can be viewed as a source of uncertainty that can
determine an alliance employee’s degree of identity with the alliance.
The presence of uncertainty between partners can destabilize the alliance
identity. Strategic alliances literature often cites three sources of partner instability. First
is the interpartner competition. If the partners themselves are competitors, as is the
case in horizontal alliances, then there is a stronger sense of internal competitive
intensity than in the case of vertical alliances (Luo et al. 2007). In this case, it is
expected that individual actors will identify more with their firm rather than with the
alliance.
The second source of instability is due to organizational distance among the
alliance partners. “The underlying values and attitudes of different cultural groups can
influence the behavior of those groups, as well as the nature of decisions they make”
(Hewett and Bearden 2001). Empirical studies exist linking cultural distance (Hofstede
1980) to level of cooperativeness among two parties from different national cultures
(Chatman and Barsade 1995; Li et al. 2010; Williams et al. 1998). Organizational
distance is also more closely associated with the most significant dimension of
organizational identity – distinctiveness. Ashforth and Mael (1989) state that
distinctiveness in values, beliefs, and social norms of a group in relation to those of
comparable groups enhances identity with an in-group. Organizational cultures have
distinctive values, beliefs, and social norms. Thus, managers are less likely to identify
with the alliance and more with their firms when there is a significant organizational
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distance between alliance partners. Therefore, organizational proximity is viewed here
as one indicator of alliance partner stability that can enhance relative alliance identity.
The third potentially destabilizing factor is the degree to which an alliance partner
is dependent on the other. If one party is dependent on another, the dependent party
tends to lose its autonomy and power to decide for itself (Geyskens et al. 1996). Such
loss of autonomy can result in less identification with the power-wielding partner. Also,
the power-wielding partner may see an opportunity to act opportunistically against a
partner whose defenses are weakened due to being dependent on the partner.
Together, the three sources of alliance partner stability will help social actors of the
alliance to strongly identify with the alliance. Stated formally:

H13: Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative alliance
identity.

Table 9 below offers a summary of hypotheses introduced in this chapter. Table
10 offers summary of construct definitions used in the conceptual model of this
dissertation and in the hypotheses of this dissertation.
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Table 9. Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with alliance
performance.

Hypothesis 2

Deviant-personal opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with
alliance performance.

Hypothesis 3*

Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors.

Hypothesis 4

Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors.

Hypothesis 5*

Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most
effective at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior.

Hypothesis 6*

Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors, such that the intermediate level of trust is most
effective at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.

Hypothesis 7*

Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors.

Hypothesis 8*

Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors.

Hypothesis 9*

The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.

Hypothesis 10*

The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.

Hypothesis 11*

Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring.

Hypothesis 12*

Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust.

Hypothesis 13*

Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative alliance
identity.

*hypotheses not previously explored in the extent literature
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Table 10. Construct Definitions
Construct

Definition

Strategic Alliances

Collaborative exchange relationships between two or more firms
to gain a competitive advantage from joint efforts, risk sharing,
and meeting complex market demands.

Rogue Opportunism

An alliance partner’s own self-interest seeking and violations of
expected norms of behavior at the expense of other alliance
partner.

Deviant-Personal
Opportunism

An individual alliance employee’s self-interest seeking through
devious means that threatens the well-being of an alliance, its
members, or both.

Monitoring

Procedures designed and incorporated within a strategic alliance
relationship by one party to acquire information and ascertain a
partner’s activities and conduct.

Trust

The perceived credibility that the alliance partner will behave in
the best interest of the exchange relationship.

Relative Alliance
Identity

The extent to which alliance managers feel a sense of
connection with the alliance rather than with their respective
alliance partner-firm.

Alliance Partner
Stability

The degree of stability among factors related to the internal
alliance environment as presented by the lack of interpartner
competition, presence of organizational proximity, and presence
of partner independence.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the method that was used in this
research. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section details the multi-period
behavioral simulation that was used to collect and analyze Study 1 data. A general
overview is provided, the sample is described, the data collection procedure is
explained, the measurement technique is discussed, and the analytical techniques for
testing hypotheses are reviewed. The second section explains the methodology that
was used to analyze cross-sectional data in Study 2. Similarly to Study 1, a general
overview is provided, the sample is described, the data collection procedure is
explained, the measurement technique is discussed, and the analytical techniques are
reviewed.

Study 1: Behavioral Simulation of Supplier-Buyer Relationships
To gain more realism from studies on exchange relationships, it is useful to
analyze data collected from a behavioral business simulation. Exchange relationship
environments that mimic a true business environment are valuable for studying
exchange behavior such as opportunism (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983). Research in
marketing has employed a variety of simulation techniques to study exchange
relationships (Gundlach et al. 1995). A marketing channel simulation by Cadotte (1990)
has been successfully utilized in marketing research studying phenomena related to
business-to-business relationships (Arias‐Aranda 2007; Gundlach et al. 1995; Gundlach
and Cadotte 1994). This simulation has been identified as the most relevant to the
phenomenon of interest that is explored in this study.
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Research Setting
The multi-period behavioral simulation closely mimics vertical strategic alliances
between suppliers and resellers of microcomputer industry in its early stages of
development. The simulation data together with a survey can capture individual
partners’ strategic decisions, contractual arrangements, strategic behavior, and the
outcomes of the relationship. Moreover, the contractual arrangements range from arm’s
length to long-term relational contracts, which can be very useful when assessing some
of the constructs of interest here.
Sample
Senior undergraduate students in marketing participated in the simulation. The
participants were enrolled in a capstone marketing strategy class across several major
U.S. based universities during the fall 2014 and spring 2015 semesters. Students within
any given class were randomly assigned to a group of four or five member teams. Each
team was then randomly assigned to be a manufacturer or a reseller of
microcomputers. Prior to initiating the simulation itself, each team self-selected its
members’ role responsibilities. Each member chose primary and secondary role
responsibilities from the following options: president, supply chain relationships,
marketing & marketing research, sales management, purchasing, and accounting &
finance. In total, the sample consisted of 228 potential respondents. This sample size
ultimately produced 134 evaluated relationships between suppliers and resellers (refer
to Chapter 4 for more details).
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Procedure
A survey was administered to participants prior to the last cycle (i.e., prior to the
last business quarter being processed). The survey was administered during this time to
allow for an in-simulation monetary incentive that was reported on each team’s financial
statements after the last business quarter was processed. Performance data was
obtained from the objectively collected data through the simulation itself. The survey
data along with performance data available from the simulation were then analyzed.
Measurement: Alliance Partner Stability
As stated in Chapter 2, alliance partner stability is the degree of stability among
factors related to the internal alliance environment as presented by the presence of
organizational proximity and presence of partner independence (adapted from Luo
2006b). Alliance partner stability is measured as a composite score of these two
dimensions.
Organizational Proximity. An adaptation of Simonin’s (1999) measure was used
to capture similarities in alliance partners’ organizational cultures. The measure is a 7point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) the
management style of your partner is very similar to the management style of our firm;
(2) the business culture of your partner is very similar to ours; and (3) the business
practices of your partner are very similar to the business practices of our firm.
Partner Independence. An adaptation of Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) measure
was used to capture the degree to which partners were independent from each other.
The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items
are (1) this partner provided vital resources we would find difficult to obtain from other
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resellers; (2) It would have been difficult to replace this partner; and (3) Our strategic
objectives would suffer greatly if we would have lost this partner. Since it was of interest
to capture independence rather than dependence of alliance partners, reverse coded
values were used for analysis purposes.
Measurement: Relational Factors
Trust. The measure of trust was adapted from the Hewett and Bearden (2001)
adaptation of the Doney and Cannon (1997) scale. The measure is a 7-point Likert
scale consisting of six items. Specifically, the items are (1) this partner kept promises it
made to our firm; (2) this partner was not always honest with us (R); (3) we believe the
information this partner provided to us; (4) this partner was trustworthy; (5) this partner
was genuinely concerned that our supply chain relationship succeeds; and (6) Our firm
trusts that this partner kept our best interests in mind.
Monitoring. A combination of existing measures of monitoring was adapted from
sales literature (Anderson and Oliver 1987) and supplier-buyer relationships literature
(Gundlach and Cannon 2010; Heide et al. 2007). Anderson and Oliver’s (1987)
measure of monitoring efforts is within the sales management literature. Their measure
was adapted and brought into supplier-buyer relationships literature by Heide et al.
(2007). Gundlach and Cannon (2010) developed their own measure of monitoring of
B2B exchange relationships. While not one of the three measures on its own translates
well into the context of this dissertation, combining the three measures together offered
a strong starting point for a measure of monitoring strategic alliance partners. The
measure used here is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of four items. Specifically, the
respondents were asked how much their firm monitored their business partners across
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the following dimensions: (1) overall investment in the relationship; (2) level of
cooperation; (3) activities outside of our supply chain relationship; and (4) response
speed when undergoing contract negotiations.
Relative Alliance Identity. This measure was adapted from Fisher et al. (1997)
and Wieseke et al. (2012). The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of five items.
Specifically, the items are (1) seeing both our firm and [partner name] succeed would
feel more satisfying than seeing only our firm succeed; (2) attacks by other firms on
[partner name] would feel like attacks on our own firm; (3) someone praising our
relationship with [partner name] would feel like a personal compliment; (4) if I had to
make a choice between doing what was best for my firm or for the supply chain
relationship with [partner name], I would do what was best for the relationship; and (5)
when I talked with other about the relationship with [partner name], I usually say “we”
rather than “they.”
Measurement: Rogue-Firm and Deviant-Personal Opportunism
Rogue-firm Opportunism. Several operationalizations of opportunistic behavior
exist in literature. The differences stem predominantly from contextual variations. While
not one measure of opportunism seems to dominate in the literature, all the measures
share some commonalities. The measure used in this dissertation is adapted from
Gundlach et al. (1995) for three reasons. First, this measure captures the shared
commonalities in a most effective manner. Second, the authors study buyer-supplier
exchange relationships. The relationship between buyer and supplier is most often the
relationship represented in vertical alliances. Vertical alliances are the studied sample
here. Third, the authors utilize their measure in the same multi-period behavioral
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simulation used in this study. Thus, using a measure that is proven to work in the same
simulation environment is warranted. The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of
four items. Specifically, the items are (1) this partner exaggerated needs to get what it
desires; (2) this partner was not always sincere; (3) this partner altered facts to get what
it wanted; and (4) This partner breached agreements to its benefits.
Deviant-Firm Opportunistic Behavior. Individual alliance employees engage in
opportunistic behavior passively or actively. Individuals who engage in passive
opportunistic behavior don’t seek out such behavior, but instead when an opportunity
presents itself they don’t necessarily do anything to correct their behavior. On the other
hand, individuals who actively behave in an opportunistic manner seek out relationship
arbitrages that hurt some other employee or party involved in the exchange. To capture
this passive and active dimension of opportunism, a measure from Seggie et al. (2013)
was adapted here. Some adaptation was necesary because their research investigates
passive and active opportunism at the partner-firm rather than individual level. The
measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of five items. Specifically, the items are (1)
people delivered on their promises; (2) people offered their best effort to make the
relationship work; (3) people responded in timely manner to our inquiries; (4) people
provided truthful information to us; and (5) people followed closely their verbal
agreements with our firm.
Measurement: Outcomes
Performance outcomes were measured using two measures obtained directly
from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s return on assets (ROA) and (b)
partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal relationship. The ROA measure was
83

obtained from the financial statements of each firm. The end of the simulation ROA was
used here (i.e., ROA after the last business quarter was processed). The gross profit
from the focal relationship was computed as the revenue minus the cost of products
sold as a result of a specific relationship rather than just an overall firm’s gross profit
that covers business dealings across various relationships. Strategic alliance research
often relies on perceptual measures of performance because it is difficult to obtain
objective data for a specific alliance. This is an often noted limitation of strategic alliance
research. It is a limitation of Study 2 in this dissertation as well (refer to Study 2 section
below). However, the use of the business simulation is very helpful in this regard since it
is possible to obtain objective performance data not only at the firm level but at a
business relationship level. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported in Chapter 4
because the objective data allow for direct interpretation of the beta coefficients. In the
case of ROA, the beta coefficient represents a percentage change in the ROA for each
additional unit of deviant-personal or rogue-firm opportunism. In the case of gross profit,
the beta coefficient represents the gross profit dollar change for each additional unit of
deviant-personal or rogue-firm opportunism.
Measurement: Controls
Universe Quarters. This variable is used to control for number of simulated
business quarters in the simulation. The simulations used by professors across the US
come in two different versions. One version is four quarters long, and the other version
is six quarters long. All other aspects of the simulation are identical. The length of the
simulation could affect financial outcomes as well as the relational variables examined
here. Therefore, this control variable is warranted.
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UniverseID. This variable is used to control for possible differences due to
number of different class sections. Each simulation session is referred to by the
management team of the simulation and by the simulation coaches as a universe.
Often, one universe exists per each class. The data was collected across various
classes from various US-based universities. These location variations could introduce
variance within the collected data. Controlling for this potential noise will minimize the
error term in the analysis.
Analysis
Structural equation modeling in AMOS version 20 was utilized to assess the
measurement model. SEM is the appropriate technique used to purify the measurement
items for each of the constructs shown in the conceptual model of this dissertation
(Figure 1 in Chapter 1). A measurement model seeks to evaluate how well the observed
indicators (survey data points) serve as a measurement instrument for the latent
variables depicted in the conceptual model of this dissertation. This statistical technique
allows the testing of construct validity (i.e., convergent validity, and discriminant validity)
within a single research study (Garver and Mentzer 1999) by utilizing confirmatory factor
analysis.
Previous studies utilizing this specific business simulation that investigated
business-to-business relationships successfully utilized multiple regression technique
(Gundlach et al. 1995; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994). For this reason, hierarchical linear
regression was also used here to analyze the hypothesized relationships in SPSS
version 22. In addition, as conceptual models become more complex, it becomes
difficult to assess which terms in the regression models drive the explanatory power of
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the model. Hierarchical linear regression (HLR) can be used in such instances to help
identify which terms of the regression models make a significant statistical and practical
contribution to the conceptual model. HLR is often used to compare successive
regression models and to determine the significance that each of the terms introduced
in any successive regression model has above and beyond the formal model. Each
HLR model introduces a new set of regression terms in addition to the previous model
in a hierarchical manner.

Study 2: Cross-Sectional Examination of Strategic Alliances
This study examines the hypothesized relationships across a cross-sectional
sample of strategic alliances. Specifically, the interest is to examine (1) contextual
factors that affect the presence or the need for the relational factors, (2) the direct
effects and the interaction between trust and monitoring on rogue-firm and deviantpersonal opportunistic behavior, and (3) the impact of opportunistic behaviors on
alliance partner performance. Hierarchical linear regression is used to analyze the
hypotheses.
Sample
The sample frame for this study came from the Securities Data Company (SDC)
Platinum database. SDC database is the most extensive and most reliable secondary
database utilized in empirical research of strategic alliances (Schilling 2009). The
sample frame consists of strategic alliances that were in existence as of January 1 st,
2014 and did not dissolve prior to December 31st, 2014. Study 1 data collection took

86

place during February and March of 2015. This time lag will allow the capture of
outcome variables for fiscal year 2014.
The starting sample size consisted of 1,944 strategic alliances where both
partners were from the US. The US based partners-only sample was considered for two
reasons. An international sample would introduce unnecessary noise in the data due to
different national cultures. The data needed for calculating the environmental dynamism
control variable and variables used to analyze endogeneity concerns (See Chapter 4)
are readily available only for US industries. The sample consisted of strategic alliances
that were established between January 1st, 2010 and December 31st, 2014 and still met
the criteria mentioned above. Data collection continued until a sample size of 180
completed responses was established. Considering similar data collections attempts in
strategic alliances literature (e.g., Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003; Sartor and Beamish
2014), this sample size is sufficient to allow for empirical evaluation of the conceptual
model presented in this dissertation.
Procedure
Existing research utilizing secondary datasets to study partner-level and alliancelevel constructs is plentiful (e.g., Sampson 2007). However, secondary data alone does
not offer proper proxies for studying individual-level variables such as deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior and even some firm-level relational constructs. This may be
another reason why opportunistic behavior at the individual level has been ignored in
the existing literature. To assess both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic
behavior, the secondary SDC data was combined with a primary survey data collection.
Secondary alliance databases in combination with primary data collection techniques
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such as surveys have been used in prior research successfully (Krishnan et al. 2006; Li
et al. 2010).
The survey instrument was constructed utilizing the measures from Study 1.
Minor adjustments were made to some of the measures in order for the measures to be
more suitable for the context of this study. The changes predominantly consisted of
minor wording edits that did not change the meaning of the original items. Face validity
of the wording changes was discussed among academic experts. Based on their input,
the survey instrument was appropriately adjusted and finalized.
Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), Mergent Database, Ward’s Business Directory of US
Private and Public Companies, corporate websites, or SEC filings were utilized to
collect contact information for each of the partner firms represented in the final sample
of strategic alliances. A key informant from each partner firm from the sample was
identified, contacted, and prequalified by an email (Campbell 1955). This approach
helped with (1) assessing whether the key informant is highly knowledgeable about the
specific alliance, (2) obtaining cooperation, and (3) verifying the informant’s email. It
was expected that some of the key informants were no longer working with the firm
participating in a respective alliance, while others were not interested in participating in
the study. This expectation ultimately eliminated some alliance partner firms from the
sample (refer to Chapter 4 for more details). However, the vast number of alliances
established during the time frame considered ultimately provided a sufficient sample
size.
To help increase the response rate, each participant was promised the following
monetary and non-monetary incentives:
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1) $20 towards St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital.
2) Respondents were assured that their individual responses would stay highly
confidential and that the researchers would adhere to a strict university data
collection policy.
3) Anonymity was also promised to respondents. However, in order to donate the
$20 towards St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, respondents’ names and
email addresses were collected and disclosed through the survey to the primary
researcher only.
4) A summary of generalized findings was offered to each respondent.
Measurement
The measurement section is split into five sections describing variables of
interest from left to right on the conceptual model depicted in Chapter 1. Specifically, the
sections are alliance partner stability, relational factors, opportunism, outcomes, and
controls.
Measurement: Alliance Partner Stability
As stated in Chapter 2, alliance partner stability is the degree of stability among
factors related to the internal alliance environment as presented by the presence of
organizational proximity and presence of partner independence (adapted from Luo
2006b). Alliance partner stability is measured as a composite score of these two
dimensions.
Organizational Proximity. Adapted Simonin’s (1999) measure was used to
capture similarities in alliance partners’ organizational cultures. The measure is a 7-
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point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) the
management style of our alliance partner is very similar to the management style of our
organization; (2) the corporate culture of our alliance partner is very similar to ours; and
(3) the business practices of our alliance partner are very similar to the business
practices of our organization
Partner Independence. The measure was adapted from the dependence
measure established by Sivadas and Dwyer (2000). The measure is a 7-point Likert
scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) our alliance partner
provided vital resources we would find difficult to obtain elsewhere; (2) it would be
difficult to replace our alliance partner; and (3) our strategic objectives would suffer
greatly if we would lose our alliance partner. Since it was of interest to capture
independence rather than dependence of alliance partners, reverse coded values were
used for analysis purposes.
Measurement: Relational Factors
Trust. The same measure as in Study 1 was used to capture trust in an alliance
partner. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of six items. Specifically, the items are (1)
the alliance partner firm keeps promises it makes to our firm; (2) the alliance partner
firm is not always honest with us (R); (3) we believe the information that the alliance
partner firm provided to us; (4) this alliance partner firm is trustworthy; (5) the alliance
partner firm is genuinely concerned that our alliance succeeds; and (6) our firm trusts
that the alliance partner firm keeps our best interests in mind.
Monitoring. The same measure as in Study 1 was used here to capture
monitoring of alliance partners. Small wording edits were required to translate the items
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into the context of this study. For example, the reference to the simulation’s “supply
chain relationship partner” was replaced with “partner” to better reference the alliance
partner that the respondents were thinking of while taking the survey. The measure is a
7-point Likert scale consisting of four items. Specifically, the items are (1) partner’s
overall investment in the relationship; (2) partner’s level of cooperation; (3) partner’s
activities outside of the relationship; and (4) response timeliness of the partner.
Relative Alliance Identity. The same measure with slight changes was used here
as in Study 1 to capture relative alliance identity. It is a 6-point Likert scale consisting of
five items and anchored by “my firm” and “the alliance.” Using these anchors forced
respondents to cognitively recognize which organization they identify with more – the
firm or the alliance. The items used here are (1) [my firm/the alliance]’s successes are
my successes; (2) when someone criticizes the colleagues in [my firm/the alliance], it
feels like a personal insult; (3) when someone praises [my firm/the alliance], it feels like
a personal compliment; (4) if I had to make a choice between doing what was best for
my firm or for the alliance, I would do what was best for [my firm/the alliance]; and (5)
when I talk about the colleagues in [my firm/the alliance], I usually say “we” rather than
“they.”
Measurement: Rogue-Firm and Deviant-Firm Opportunism
Rogue-Firm Opportunism. The same measure as in Study 1 was used to capture
rogue-firm opportunism in an alliance partner. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of
four items. Specifically, the items are (1) our partner firm exaggerated needs to get what
it desires; (2) our partner firm is not always sincere; (3) senior management at the
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partner firm alters facts to get what it wants; and (4) our partner firm breaches formal or
informal agreements to its benefits.
Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior. The same measure as in Study 1 was
used to capture deviant-personal opportunism. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of
five items. The following preamble was used to introduce the items: “To what extent
would you agree/disagree that certain individuals from the partner firm …” Then, the
items that followed are (1) … do not deliver on their promises; (2) … withhold effort; (3)
… responded in timely manner to our inquiries (R); (4) … provide false information; and
(5) … breach agreements to benefit personally.
Measurement: Outcomes
Alliance Financial Performance. To capture the alliance financial performance, a
commonly used measure in the business-to-business relationship literature was used
here (e.g., Hewett and Bearden 2001). Specifically, this measure captures market
share, sales, return on assets (ROA), profit margin, and return on investment (ROI).
Considering that objective alliance performance data is not readily available to
academia, perceptual measures of alliance performance is a suitable option. Perceptual
alliance performance measures are well accepted in strategic alliances research
(Sarkar et al. 2001).
Alliance Strategic Performance. A measure from Sarkar et al. (2001) was utilized
to capture the alliance strategic performance. Specifically, this perceptual measure
captures the degree to which it is anticipated that strategic objectives of an alliance will
be met. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are
(1) during the last year, the collaboration provided a great opportunity to learn from our
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partner firm; (2) collaborating with this alliance partner firm during the last year was a
wise business decision; and (3) our strategic objectives set for this alliance for the year
2014 were achieved.
Measurement: Controls
Alliance Governance Mode. TCE suggests that the level of risk (i.e., opportunistic
behavior) from transactional hazards depends on whether an alliance is a non-equity
(i.e., market organization) or equity (i.e., hierarchy organization) based alliance. Alliance
governance mode was operationalized as a binary variable, where non-equity alliances
were coded with 0 and equity alliances were coded with 1. The data were collected from
the SDC database.
Environmental Dynamism. The primary focus of this dissertation is to estimate
how various relationship-related constructs affect opportunistic behaviors, because
existing literature in strategic alliances offers still relatively limited research in this area.
However, existing research is abundant on the topic of business environment and how it
affects the structuring of alliances and behaviors of alliance partners. For this reason,
environmental dynamism must be controlled for in this dissertation. Environmental
dynamism is a composite measure of competitive intensity in the market (Ang 2008)
and market uncertainty (Li et al. 2010).
To capture competitive intensity in the market, the formula offered by Ang (2008)
was adapted here. First, a 4-digit SIC code for the alliance was obtained from the SDC
database. Second, data regarding the market size within the industry (in terms of sales)
was recorded. Third, data regarding the number of competitors within the 4-digit SIC
code was recorded. Both the industry sales and number of competitors’ data points
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were obtained from the First Research Mergent database. Fourth, competitive intensity
was computed by dividing the market size by the number of competitors within the
industry. Fiscal year 2014 was considered for this computation.
Market uncertainty is defined at time T as the standard deviation of the monthly
return of the value-weighted industry i portfolio from time T-120 months to time T. Time
T was set to January 1st, 2014 since this was the beginning of the fiscal year considered
for the outcome measures. “Monthly stock return data are available for various
industries from Kenneth French’s website
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/)”. An SIC code for the alliance
was obtained from the SDC database and used to identify the correct industry for the
monthly stock return data from Kenneth French’s website. This measure has been
successfully applied in strategic alliances research. Li et al. (2010) used this measure of
market uncertainty to capture external threats to strategic alliances. This measure offers
a sense of a volatility in the market due to changing wants and needs of customers
within that industry (Li et al. 2010; Robinson 2008).
As mentioned previously, environmental dynamism is a composite score of the
two dimensions. To create the composite score, both variables were first standardized
since each utilizes a different scale. Z-scores were calculated for each variable and then
added together to get at environmental dynamism.
Appendix A presents the items used in a survey for Study 1 and Study 2 in a
more readable tabular form.
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Analysis
Hierarchical linear regression was used to analyze the hypotheses. As
conceptual models become more complex, consisting of several direct effects of
independent variables and possible interactions, it becomes difficult to assess which
terms in the regression models drive the explanatory power of the model. However, as
theory and practical considerations narrow down the list of variables and focus the
conceptual model, hierarchical linear regression (HLR) can then be used to help identify
which terms of the regression models make a significant statistical and practical
contribution to the conceptual model. HLR is often used to compare successive
regression models and to determine the significance that each of the terms introduced
in any successive regression model has above and beyond the formal model. Each
HLR model introduces a new set of regression terms in addition to the previous model
in a hierarchical manner.
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CHAPTER IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter presents the analysis and results of the dissertation. The chapter is
divided into two main sections, one detailing Study 1 and the other Study 2 analysis and
results. In Study 1, sample characteristics are first presented followed by the
measurement model. The measurement model sub-section checks for validity and
reliability of each measure used in both studies. Lastly, the hypotheses’ tests and
results are offered using hierarchical linear regression. In Study 2, the sample
characteristics are presented first. Second, an endogeneity test of the relational factors
variables is presented to check for a potential reverse causality concerns. Then, the
hypotheses’ tests and results are offered using hierarchical linear regression.

Study 1 Analysis
Sample Characteristics
The data was collected through undergraduate student participation in a webbased business simulation designed for supply chain management capstone business
courses. The simulation exposed students to various aspects of managing strategic
relationships with supply chain business partners. The strategic relationships consisted
of suppliers and resellers. Each company, whether a supplier or a reseller, consisted on
average of four students.
Students participating in the simulation were located at universities across the
United States. Students who participated in the simulation during the fall 2014 and
spring 2015 academic semesters were considered for the data collection. In addition to
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the objective performance data collected directly from the simulation, an online survey
was created on a secure university-hosted Qualtrics server to capture the additional
variables of interest as dictated by the conceptual model of this dissertation. Each
company (i.e., student team) had a unique business name. Therefore, the survey was
tailored to each class, such that it reflected a set of companies that existed within that
class only. Each team was then asked to evaluate two strategic partner firms on a set of
items that remained identical across all classes and universities. Students were asked
to evaluate two strategic partner firms with which their firm interacted most often during
the span of the simulation.
Two versions of the simulation were played by the students. The only difference
between the two versions is the number of business quarters played by participants.
Professors chose either four- or six-quarter simulations for their classes. Professors
were asked to introduce the survey to students shortly after the quarter prior to the last
quarter was processed (i.e., either after quarter three in the four-quarter version or after
quarter five in the six-quarter version). Depending on class schedule, this allowed
students to take somewhere between 48 to 96 hours to complete the survey. Students
were asked to complete the survey at least 6 hours prior to processing of the last
quarter. This requirement was necessary to allow for distribution of the in-game
simulation money reward. Each student who completed the survey was rewarded a
certain amount of simulation money that would show up on the team’s income
statement as “other income.” The amount awarded would depend on the size of the
team, because the maximum amount per team was set to $200,000. For example, if the
team consisted of four students, then each student would be rewarded $50,000. If
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everyone within a company (a team) completed the survey, then an additional bonus of
$50,000 was awarded to the company. Thus, the maximum potential reward equaled
$250,000.
As an additional incentive to participate, professors and students were promised
to receive relationship dashboards. Relationship dashboards were developed
specifically for this dissertation to serve as an incentive, but also to potentially become a
feature of the simulation that can be used in the future. A relationship dashboard is a
one-page presentation of a company’s corporate image. The corporate image is an
evaluation of a company by all of that company’s business partners. Professors
welcomed this feature, and it helped to boost participation rate. An example of a
relationship dashboard is presented in Appendix B.
Out of the total of 228 students who participated in the simulation and who were
asked to take the survey, 147 responded to the survey. This translates into a 64.47%
response rate. The 147 respondents represented 73 companies. Each of the
respondents was asked to evaluate two of their supply chain business partner firms with
which their firm interacted most during the simulation. Some firms developed only one
supply chain relationship throughout the simulation. In these cases, only one supply
chain relationship was evaluated by the respondents. If more than one person per
company evaluated the same supply chain relationship, then the individual responses
were aggregated. This resulted in 134 relationship evaluations. The 134 evaluated
relationships serve as a final sample size for this study.
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Measurement Model
Confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS version 20 was performed first to assess
the measurement model fit statistics and the validity and reliability of the measures. A
measurement model with all items was run initially. The initial CFA run did not offer
satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices. Therefore, some measure purification was required.
The initial CFA run indicated that the item Trust2R was loading poorly on its construct.
Its loading was .408, which is below the desired standard of .7 (Garver and Mentzer
1999). Examining wording of the item revealed weaknesses that, in addition to very
poor loadings, justified elimination of the item from the measurement model. The item
included the word “always” and is reverse coded. The word “always” is an example of
an absolute statement, which should be avoided in survey research. Absolute
statements are detrimental to Likert scales, because they force respondents to interpret
these statements as a binary choice. Moreover, the reverse coding of this item could
confound the problem of absolute statements.
After another CFA run, the item Rogue1 was deleted from the model for the
following reasons. First, the item loading was below the generally accepted rule that all
items should load on their respective constructs with loadings of .7 or above (Garver
and Mentzer 1999). Second, the high regression weights modification indices identify
Rogue1 as an item that cross-loads heavily with various constructs of the model.
Primarily, this item was cross-loading with deviant-personal opportunism items. Upon
examination of Rogue1 wording, the use of the phrase “partner” rather than “partner
firm” may be interpreted as an individual rather than the strategically opportunistic move
of a firm. For these reasons, the item was deleted.
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For very similar reasons, the items Monitoring2 and Trust3 were also deleted.
The item loading was below the suggested .7 level for both of these items. In addition,
the modification index for these items was greater than 10. Modification index is a
measure of whether an item loads on multiple factors. A modification index coefficient
value of 3.85 or greater indicates that the chi-square statistic can be statistically
significantly reduced with the estimation of the coefficient. A more conservative
approach, where the coefficient value of a modification index equal or is greater than
10, would recommend an item for deletion (Fassinger 1987). Therefore, these items
were deleted.
At this stage, the CFA model indicated that the regression weight modification
index for items Deviant3 and Identity4 was above acceptable level of 10 for more than
one regression weight between the items and items from other constructs. Such
significant cross-loadings call for a closer examination of the two items. Deviant3 item
states “People responded in timely manner to our inquiries.” Just because a person
does not respond in timely manner to someone’s inquiries, does not necessarily mean
that they did so for opportunistic reasons. This item was likely misinterpreted by the
survey respondents. Identity4 item states “If I had to make a choice between doing what
was best for my firm or for the supply chain relationship with [partner name], I would do
what was best for the relationship.” This relative alliance identity is the only item among
the identity items that forces respondents to make a choice between their firm and the
supply chain partner. It forces respondents into a survivor state of mind – its either us or
them situation. Other items do not require such a survivor choice.
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At this point the confirmatory factor analysis produced satisfactory goodness-offit indices. Specifically, CMIN/DF = 1.812, CFI = .941, IFI = .943, and RMSEA = .078.
The CFA loadings are presented in Table 11.

Table 11. CFA Loadings for Study 1 Data

Deviant1
Deviant2
Deviant4
Deviant5
Rogue2
Rogue3
Rogue4
Trust1
Trust4
Trust5
Trust6
41Monitoring1
Monitoring3
Monitoring4
Identity1
Identity2
Identity3
Identity5
Proximity1
Proximity2
Proximity3
Indep1
Indep2
Indep3

DeviantPersonal
Opportunism
.927
.892
.840
.896

Rogue-Firm
Opportunism

Trust

Monitoring

Relative
Alliance
Identity

Organizational
Proximity

Independence

.960
.827
.862
.921
.892
.939
.934
.909
.730
.856
.785
.716
.818
.842
.891
.876
.891
.753
.964
.926

Construct Validity
Construct validity is achieved when a construct corresponds to what its
dimensions are supposed to measure (Peter 1981). Construct validity is assessed
based on convergent and discriminant validity. A confirmation of the measures’
convergent validity is provided by the fact that average variance extracted (AVE) for
each construct is above the .50 level (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Indeed, all constructs
demonstrate AVE > .50. Table 12 provides specific AVE values. Furthermore, Garver
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and Mentzer (1999) point out that researchers can be more certain that convergent
validity was achieved when all factor loadings are above .70 level. All 24 items in the
final measurement model have factor loadings above the .70 level.

Table 12. Properties of Study 1 Constructs
Construct Name

AVE

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

1. Deviant-Personal Opportunism

.791

.93

.21

.72

.34

.46

.46

.26

2. Rogue-Firm Opportunism

.783

.46**

.91

.24

.05

.03

.10

.00

3. Trust

.849

-.85**

-.49**

.95

.32

.49

.43

.23

4. Monitoring

.697

-.59**

-.24**

.57**

.86

.29

.19

.10

5. Relative Alliance Identity

.627

-.68**

-.17*

.70**

.54**

.87

.38

.39

6. Organizational Proximity

.785

-.68**

-.33**

.66**

.44**

.62**

.91

.27

7. Partner Independence

.784

-.51**

-.05

.48**

.33**

.63**

.52**

.90

AVE:
Diagonal:
Below diagonal:

Above diagonal:

Average variance extracted
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha
Construct correlations
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level
Construct correlations squared

Discriminant validity is achieved when items from one construct do not correlate
highly with items from another construct in the model. Measures’ discriminant validity
exists when the average variance extracted for each of the constructs is greater than its
shared variance with any of the other constructs in the measurement model. In other
words, the AVE for each construct in any pair of constructs has to be larger than
squared correlations between the two constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This
condition was met for all construct pairs. All relevant statistics are presented in Table
12.
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Scale Reliability
Once satisfactory measurement model fit with clear convergent and discriminant
construct validity was established, scale reliability was assessed for all measures.
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) of .60 and above is accepted as an
indication that the scale is reliable (Churchill 1979). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha across
constructs ranged from .86 to .95.
Common Method Bias
Two tests were conducted to ensure common method bias (CMB) was not of
concern in the data. First, Herman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff
and Organ 1986) suggests running an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) while fixing the
number of factors to one. If the one factor explains more than 50% of all variance, then
CMB is a problem in the data. The test indicated that 49.70% of variance can be
explained using one factor. This test does not indicate presence of common method
bias; however, 49.70% is relatively close to the 50% mark. Therefore, another test was
utilized to assure that CMB is not a problem in the data.
The second test conducted was a common latent factor test. A common method
latent variable (CMLV) was incorporated into the measurement model in AMOS. All
observable items were then linked to the CMLV while also being linked to their intended
constructs. All paths between the observable variables and CMLV were constrained to
be equal. Constraining all paths to be equal results in regression paths with the same
numerical result, allowing for a single number that accounts for common method bias
(Gaskin 2011). This test is to show how much variance for all the items can be
accounted to a single factor (Gaskin 2011). The resulting CMLV regression weight
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equals to .47, which equals to .2209 when squared. The common variance accounted
for by this test is 22.09%. The common variance accounted for is significantly less than
50%, which strongly rejects presents of common method bias (Gaskin 2011). In
conclusion, both tests, Herman’s single factor test and the common latent factor test,
conclude that common method bias is not of concern in the data.
Nonresponse Bias Assessment
Nonresponse bias is not of concern in Study 1 due to the procedure used for
survey administration. The supply chain simulation was used within a university
classroom setting. Each simulation game consisted of either 4 or 6 quarters. Each
sampled class was given anywhere between 3 to 7 days to make decisions prior to
when the next quarter was run. The survey online link was introduced to students by
their respective professors 48 to 72 hours prior to the last quarter being processed.
Students were then given 42 to 66 hours to respond to the survey (up to 6 hours prior to
the last quarter being processed). This short time window did not justify the use of the
early and late responses technique for testing the nonresponse bias. Thanks to the
simulation money incentive for participation, a higher response rate than reported by
similar studies was achieved (64.47%). Thus, using the follow up by phone call
technique was not justified either. Such a technique is appropriate under circumstances
when the response rate is unusually low and a systematic nonresponse problem is
suspected.

104

Study 1 Measurement Model Summary
In summary, the measurement model showed satisfactory results. The CFA
process improved the measurement model and resulted in satisfactory overall
goodness-of-fit statistics with CFI = .941, IFI = .943, RMSEA = .078, and CMIN/df ratio
= 1.983. Convergent and divergent validity along with scale reliability showed
acceptable values. Common method bias and nonresponse bias do not pose a threat to
Study 1 data.

Study 1 Hypotheses
The testing of hypotheses was split into three sections. The first section tests
hypotheses between the opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. The second section
examines hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. The final
third section tests hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors.

Study 1 Hypotheses: Opportunistic Behaviors and Outcomes
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. Next,
analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that a negative relationship exists between rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured
using two measures obtained directly from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s
return on assets (ROA) and (b) partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal
relationship. The simulation money incentive for participation was taken out from the net
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income calculation before the ROA was calculated. Unstandardized beta coefficients
are reported because the objective data allows for direct interpretation of the beta
coefficients. In the case of ROA, the beta coefficient represents a percentage change in
the ROA for each additional unit of rogue-firm opportunism. In the case of gross profit,
the beta coefficient represents the gross profit dollar change for each additional unit of
rogue-firm opportunism. With ROA as the dependent variable, a significant negative
beta coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -10.44, p < .01) was found. With gross
profit as the dependent variable, a significant negative beta coefficient for rogue-firm
opportunism (β = -1,524,639, p < .10) was found. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are
supported. Table 13 presents the statistical information from the analysis.

Table 13. Study 1: Rogue-Firm Opportunism and Alliance Performance
Partner’s ROA
H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters

β†
% change

t-value

-3.33
30.83**

-1.11
2.21

-10.44***

-2.97

Partner’s Relationshipspecific Gross Profit
β†
t-value
$-value change
-946,773
4,384,806

-1.54
1.50

-1,524,639**

-1.96

17,109,465***

3.49

Linear Effects
Rogue-Firm Opp.

H1a
H1b

Intercept

82.01***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.144
.125
.055***

3.81

.105
.084
.026*
7.45***

5.08***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
†
Unstandardized Beta coefficients are used here because they are more telling. They represent
percentage change in ROA and dollar change in Gross Profit.
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that a negative relationship exists between deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Performance outcome was measured
using two measures obtained directly from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s
return on assets (ROA) and (b) partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal
relationship. As with hypothesis 1, unstandardized beta coefficients are reported. With
ROA as the dependent variable, a significant negative beta coefficient for deviantpersonal opportunism (β = -8.32, p < .01) was found. With gross profit as the
dependent variable, also a significant negative beta coefficient for deviant-personal
opportunism (β = -4,030,706, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypotheses 2a and 2b are
supported. For each additional unit of deviant-personal opportunism, partner’s ROA is
lowered by 8.32% and partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal relationship is
lowered by $4,030,706. Table 14 presents the statistical information from the analysis.

Study 1 Hypotheses: Relational Factors and Opportunistic Behaviors
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors.
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated
with deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A significant negative beta coefficient (β
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= -.24, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported. Table 15 offers the
statistical analysis summary.

Table 14. Study 1: Deviant-Personal Opportunism and Alliance Performance
Partner’s ROA
H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters

β†
% change

t-value

-4.18
28.65**

-1.37
2.01

-8.32**

-1.81

Partner’s Relationshipspecific Gross Profit
β†
t-value
$-value change
-1,048,138*
5,941,481**

-1.80
2.18

-4,030,706***

-5.02

22,481,351***

4.96

Linear Effects
Deviant-Personal Opp.

H2a
H2b

Intercept

73.78***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.112
.092
.023**

3.16

.228
.210
.149***
5.43***

12.81***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
†
Unstandardized Beta coefficients are used here because they are more telling. They represent
percentage change in ROA and dollar change in Gross Profit.

Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated
with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.02, p =
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Table 16 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
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Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship
with deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. A squared trust term was constructed by
mean centering the trust variable and then multiplying it by itself. Mean centering a
variable helps with any potential multicollinearity problems (Hair et al. 2010). A
significant beta coefficient (β = .20, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported.
The U-shaped results suggest that low and high levels of trust are associated with
increased levels of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors, while medium levels of
trust are associated with the lowest levels of deviant-personal opportunism. Table 15
offers the statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship
with rogue-firm opportunistic behavior. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.04, p =
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 6 is not supported. Table 16 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 7 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.08, p <
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 7 is not supported. Table 15 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
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Table 15. Study 1: Relational Factors and Deviant-Personal Opportunism

H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters

β

Model 1
t-value

.01
.24*

Linear Effects
(T) Trust
(M) Monitoring
RAI

H3
H7

Curvilinear Effects
T2

H5

Interactions
TxM

H9

Intercept

2.30***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic
*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

.053
.038

.08
2.14

5.12

β

Model 2
t-value

β

Model 3
t-value

β

Model 4
t-value

-.04
.10*

-.79
1.84

-.06
.08

-1.03
1.37

-.06
.09

-1.18
1.61

-.67***
-.16***
-.10*

-10.66
-2.94
-1.65

-.57***
-.18***
-.11*

-7.49
-3.23
-1.86

-.56***
-.24***
-.08

-7.30
-3.92
-1.19

.13**

2.16

.20***

2.98

-.12**

-2.16

7.28***

18.61

7.56***

20.68

.774
.765
.721***
3.64*

18.23

.782
.771
.008**
87.50***
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7.20***

.789
.778
.008**
75.79***

67.51***

Table 16. Study 1: Relational Factors and Rogue-Firm Opportunism

H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters

Model 1
t-value

β

.13
.21*

Linear Effects
(T) Trust
(M) Monitoring
RAI

H4
H8

Curvilinear Effects
T2

H6

Interactions
TxM

H10

Intercept

2.57***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic
*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

.028
.013

1.14
1.95

5.16

β

Model 2
t-value

β

Model 3
t-value

β

Model 4
t-value

.09
.14

.93
1.48

.09
.15

.96
1.53

.09
.15

.95
1.52

-.72***
-.02
.35***

-6.55
-.18
3.31

-.73***
-.02
.36***

-5.51
-.13
3.32

-.75***
-.02
.36***

-5.45
-.15
3.19

-.04

-.39

-.04

-.30

-.01

-.07

4.88***

6.34

4.75***

6.85

.317
.291
.281***
1.90

6.38

.318
.286
.001
11.90***
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4.87***

.318
.280
.000
9.88***

8.40***

Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .36, p <
.01) was found. Thus, the hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the
opposite direction. Hypothesis 8 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 16
offers the statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 9
Hypothesis 9 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and
monitoring. To compute the interaction term, first both variables were mean centered.
Mean centering a variable is just a simple algebraic transformation that helps with any
possible multicollinearity concerns. After mean centering, the variance inflation factor
(VIF) for each regression term was analyzed to assess multicollinearity. All VIFs were
below 2, which is significantly below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Hair et al. 2010).
Once there was no concern of multicollinearity, hierarchical linear regression was run
with four models: (1) control variables only, (2) control variables and direct effects of
relational factors, (3) controls, direct effects, and the curvilinear trust effect, and (4)
controls, direct effects, curvilinear trust, and the two-way interaction between trust and
monitoring. The full model 4 results indicate a statistically significant negative beta
coefficient (β = -.12, p < .05) for the interaction between trust and monitoring. Thus, the
hypothesis 9 is supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 15 offers the statistical
analysis summary, and Figure 3 depicts the curvilinear interaction. To present the
interaction graphically, the following procedure was used. First the monitoring variable
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was split into low and high monitoring groups using the median split. Then, deviantpersonal opportunism was regressed on trust for the low monitoring cases only and
then separately for the high monitoring cases. These two curves are overlapped on the
graph in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Interaction: Trust and Monitoring on Deviant-Personal Opportunism

Hypothesis 10
Hypothesis 10 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will
reduce rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and
monitoring. A similar approach to analyze the interaction and multicollinearity as for
hypothesis 9 was applied here. VIFs always remained below the value of 2; thus,
multicollinearity is not present in the data. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.01, p
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= n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 10 is not supported. Table 16 offers the statistical
analysis summary.

Study 1 Hypotheses: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors.
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 11
Hypothesis 11 stated that alliance partner stability is negatively associated with
monitoring. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .49, p < .01) was found. Thus, the
hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction.
Hypothesis 11 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 17 offers the
statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 12
Hypothesis 12 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with
trust. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .68, p < .01) was found. Thus,
hypothesis 12 is supported. Table 17 offers the statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 13
Hypothesis 13 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with
relative alliance identity. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .62, p < .01) was
found. Thus, hypothesis 13 is supported. Table 17 offers the statistical analysis
summary.
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The hypotheses, analysis results for Study 1, and corresponding analysis tables
are all summarized in Table 18.

Table 17. Study 1: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors
Dependent Variable:
H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters

Monitoring

Trust

β

t-value

β

t-value

Relative Alliance
Identity
β
t-value

-.21**
.05

-2.16
.53

-.08
-.04

-.97
-.41

-.02
-.01

-.21
-.10

.49***

6.35
.68***

10.10
.62***

8.80

6.74***

18.03

Main Effects
Alliance Partner Stability

H11
H12
H13

Intercept

7.03***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.255
.238
.231***

17.37

7.69***

18.76

.452
.439
.430***
14.84***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
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.387
.373
.365***
35.74***

27.33***

Table 18. Study 1: Hypotheses Results
H#
H1

Hypothesis
Rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated with alliance
performance.
H2 Deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated with alliance
performance.
H3 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors.
H4 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm opportunistic
behaviors.
H5 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors.
H6 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm opportunistic
behaviors.
H7 Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal opportunistic
behaviors.
H8 Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm opportunistic
behaviors.
H9 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal opportunistic
behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.
H10 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm opportunistic
behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.
H11 Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring.
H12 Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust.
H13 Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative alliance identity.
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Result
Supported

Table
13

Supported

14

Supported

15

Not Supported

16

Supported

15

Not Supported

16

Not Supported

15

Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported

16

Not Supported

16

Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported
Supported

17

15

17
17

Study 2 Analysis
Sample Characteristics
SDC Platinum database served as the source for identifying US-based strategic
alliances that also consisted of US-based partners only. Only alliances that started
during the years 2010-2014 were considered for the sample with the additional
requirement that they still be in existence on December 31st, 2014. For the criteria
justification, refer to Chapter 3. This resulted in a total sample of 1,944 alliances, which
meant 3,888 partner firms. From the 3,888 partner firms, it was possible to obtain
contact information for 1,925 partner firms, which became the original sample size. The
1,925 partner firms formed 1,055 unique alliances.
Potential informants from this mailing list were contacted by an introductory
email. Sending out the email revealed 306 contacts for which email addresses were
invalid. The remainder of 1,619 contacts were contacted up to three times over the
course of 6 weeks. Alliance partner contacts who opted-in by replying to the introductory
or follow-up emails received an email with their unique Qualtrics survey link. The optedin participants were reminded to complete the survey. The introductory email, the followup emails, and the reminder to complete the survey emails can be seen in Appendix C.
From the 1,619 sample, 41 partner firms participated in more than one alliance in
the sample. A decision was made to send only one survey to each contact due to the
concern of overburdening respondents by sending them the same survey for two or
more alliances in which they participated. Therefore, these 41 repetitive contacts were
eliminated from the sample, which resulted in 1,578 usable contacts. To eliminate these
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41 repetitive contacts, a randomization rule was established such that only the contact’s
alliance that appeared first on the mailing list was used for surveying purposes. The
mailing list was sorted by the alliance announcement date, such that the most recently
announced alliance was at the very top of the list.
From this usable sample of 1578 contacts, 162 contacts declined to participate in
the survey primarily due to not having enough time on their schedule. From the same
usable sample, 288 contacts agreed to participate and to complete the survey. From
these 288 opted-in contacts, 183 completed responses were obtained. Therefore the
usable contacts response rate is 11.60% (11.60% = (183 / 1,578) x 100), while the
opted-in contacts response rate is 63.54% (63.54% = (183 / 288) x 100). Table 19
presents the breakdown of original and completed samples per year when the alliance
was started.
Table 19. Breakdown of Original and Completed Samples Per Year
Year Established

Original Sample

Completed Survey Sample

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

83
277
659
569
337

9
21
64
54
35

Total

1925

183

Out of the 183 completed responses, only 12 were from the same 6 alliances
(i.e., 6 dyads). 52 of the 183 sample are publicly traded companies, and 131 are
privately held. The companies vary in size from small to large enterprises. The majority
of the contacts hold an executive type of position within their companies. The partner
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firms come from a variety of industry sectors. The dominant industry sectors of the
sample are business services (primarily management consulting and IT) and
pharmaceuticals, followed by a range of other sectors, such as automotive, travel and
leisure, education-related, oil, and real estate industries. A breakdown of respondents’
job titles, their company size (sales and number of employees), their company’s primary
industry, and the company’s ownership status are presented in Table 20.
Common Method Bias
Herman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff and Organ 1986)
was performed to test for common method bias. The test suggests running an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) while fixing the number of factors to one. If the one
factor explains more than 50% of all variance, then CMB is a problem in the data. The
test indicated that only 32.40% of variance could be explained using one factor. This
test does not indicate presence of common method bias.
Nonresponse Bias Assessment
Due to the potential threat of nonresponse bias in a survey research, mean
differences across three waves of the survey responses were assessed (Armstrong and
Overton 1977) for one randomly selected item from each survey construct – Rogue4,
Deviant4, M6, Trust5, Identity3, Independence3, Proximity3, StrategicPerf3, and
FinancialPerf4. A similar random selection approach was used by Gligor, Esmark, and
Holcomb (2015). The one-way ANOVA analysis did not find any mean differences
across the three waves. Therefore, it is fair to assume that no nonresponse bias exists
in the final sample. The statistics produced by this test are offered in Table 21.
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Table 20. Sample Characteristics for Study 2
Job Title

%

Annual Sales

%

Employees

%

Industry

%

CEO
President
VP
Chairman
GM
Founder
COO
CFO
CIO
Chief Product
Officer
Chief Strategy
Officer
Marketing
Manager

29%
26%
11%
8%
7%
5%
5%
2%
2%
1%

< 10 mil.
10 – 100 mil.
100 mil. – 1 bil.
> 1 bil.

26%
23%
12%
6%

< 50
50 - 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
> 1000

47%
6%
11%
3%
7%

Business Serv. – Consult.
Business Serv. – IT related
Business Serv. – Other
Pharmaceuticals
Healthcare Services
Fun/Leisure/Entertainment
Banking/Finance/Insurance
IT & Communications
Real Estate
Retail

16% Public
14% Private
10%
11%
8%
8%
7%
5%
5%
4%

1%

Manufacturing - General

3%

1%

Medical Equipment

3%

Manufacturing - Auto
Utilities
Other

2%
1%
3%

Data
Unavailable:

2%

33%

26%
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0%

Ownership %
29%
71%

0%

Table 21. Nonresponse Bias: One-way ANOVA Test
Question

Wave

N

Mean

p. value

Rogue4

1
2
3

61
61
61

2.30
2.51
2.46

.680

Deviant4

1
2
3

61
61
61

1.60
1.53
1.75

.533

Monitoring6

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.21
4.53
4.30

.593

Trust5

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.93
4.93
5.05

.899

Identity3

1
2
3

61
61
61

2.36
2.21
2.46

.691

Independence3

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.18
4.80
4.36

.110

Proximity3

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.68
4.41
4.30

.352

StrategicPerf3

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.36
4.56
4.77

.466

FinancialPerf4

1
2
3

61
61
61

4.30
4.56
4.20

.440
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Table 22. Properties of Study 2 Constructs
Construct Name

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

1. Deviant-Personal Opportunism

.80

.49

.53

.01

.00

.13

.05

.17

.22

2. Rogue-Firm Opportunism

.70**

.81

.51

.00

.01

.13

.03

.13

.20

3. Trust

-.73**

-.72**

.93

.04

.01

.15

.14

.33

.46

4. Monitoring

-.12

-.09

.20**

.78

.00

.01

.10

.03

.05

5. Relative Alliance Identity

-.03

-.10

.11

.04

.82

.01

.03

.00

.03

6. Organizational Proximity

-.37**

-.36**

.39**

.11

.10

.86

.02

.09

.07

7. Partner Independence

-.24**

-.19**

.38**

.32**

.17*

.13

.79

.15

.28

8. Financial Performance

-.41**

-.37**

.58**

.19**

.07

.30**

.39**

.93

.47

9. Strategic Performance

-.47**

-.45**

.68**

.24**

.18*

.28**

.53**

.69**

.82

Diagonal:
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha
Below diagonal:
Construct correlations
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level
Above diagonal:
Construct correlations squared
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Scale Reliability
Scale reliability was assessed for all measures. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha
(Cronbach 1951) of .60 and above is accepted as an indication that the scale is reliable
(Churchill 1979). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha across constructs ranged from .78 to .93.
Cronbach’s alpha together with the correlation matrix are summarized in Table 22.
Endogeneity Test
Before performing the actual hypothesis tests, the possibility of an endogeneity
problem in relational factors variables must be addressed. An independent variable is
labeled as endogenous when there is a significant correlation between the independent
variable and the error term of the model (Wooldridge 2012). Endogeneity in
independent variables can come from one of four sources: (1) errors-in-variables (i.e.,
measurement error), (2) autoregression, (3) omitted variables in theoretical models, or
(4) it can be caused by simultaneous causality also known as reciprocal causality
(Kennedy 2008). Points (1) and (2) are not so relevant to this study. More relevant to
this study are points (3) and (4). In the social sciences, we do our best to eliminate the
third source of endogeneity by introducing control variables into our models. However,
no matter how much we try to control for all possible explanations of our dependent
variables, there can always be something else, some spurious variable, which we failed
to account for. While the third source of endogeneity can be addressed, at least to a
certain degree, by control variables, eliminating the fourth source of endogeneity is not
as straightforward.
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In this dissertation’s theoretical model, the fourth source of endogeneity,
reciprocal causality, is of most concern. It is argued here that relational factors (trust,
monitoring, relative alliance identity) have an effect on opportunistic behaviors. For
example, if there is trust among partners in an alliance, then the alliance partner is less
likely to misbehave towards the focal partner firm. However, one could also make the
argument that due to the presence of opportunistic behaviors in a strategic alliance,
partners will not trust each other. This is what is known as simultaneous causation. The
backward causal link, if present in the data, can produce biased OLS estimators.
Assume the following simple regression equation:
y = β0 + β1x + u
In order to obtain an unbiased and efficient OLS β1 estimator, it must be true that x is an
exogenous variable. In other words, there cannot be another variable that explains both
x and y in the equation or that potentially causes the backward causality. If x is not
exogeneous, then x is endogenous and we would have to assume that:
Cov(x,u) ≠ 0
This coviariate between x and the error term u is what ultimately causes the
endogeneity problem. To test whether such a covariate exists in the model’s regression
equations, a commonly used test is introduced in the analysis, called the Durbin-WuHausman test (Hui et al. 2013; Semadeni, Withers, and Certo 2014; Wooldridge 2012).
Ultimately, this test compares OLS estimators and 2SLS estimators and determines
whether there are statistically significant differences between the two. If statistically
significant differences exist, then it can be concluded that endogeneity is indeed a
problem in the theoretical model, and 2SLS estimators should be used instead of OLS
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estimators. However, 2SLS estimators are less efficient than OLS estimators when the
explanatory (independent) variable is exogenous, because 2SLS estimators have larger
standard errors then OLS estimators (Wooldridge 2012). Therefore, if the Durbin-WuHausman test determines that there are no statistically significant differences between
the two estimators, then it can be concluded that the independent variable is not
endogenous and, thus, the OLS estimators are more efficient than 2SLS. In this case,
OLS estimators are more accurate and should be preferred over 2SLS estimators.
To be able to compute 2SLS estimators, first it is necessary to identify one or
more suitable instrumental variables. A satisfactory instrumental variable, called z, is
one that meets two conditions:
1) Cov(z,x) ≠ 0. This simply means that instrumental variable z is related to x; i.e., it
“is relevant for explaining variation in x … sometimes referred to as instrument
relevance” (Wooldridge 2012). More relevant instrumental variables present
stronger correlations with the potentially endogenous variable x (Kennedy 2008).
2) Cov(z,u) = 0. This condition means that the instrumental variable z is exogenous
in the simple regression equation provided earlier. Therefore, this criterion is
often referred to as “instrument exogeneity” (Wooldridge 2012). This criterion
refers to “the degree to which an instrument is uncorrelated with the disturbance
term [error]” (Kennedy 2008).
In practice it is often difficult to find an instrumental variable that satisfies both
criteria above. This is due to the fact that “instrument relevance and exogeneity often
work against one another” (Semadeni et al. 2014). For this reason, in practice often the
quality of the instrumental variable is compromised on one or the other criterion. The
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compromise tends to be made against the second criterion, which proves to be more
difficult to satisfy. It is often not satisfied because we do not know the true error terms in
the simple regression presented above. Thus, researchers often substitute the second
criterion with either (1) theoretical arguments that would suggest the instrumental
variable is indeed an exogenous variable, (2) substituting Cov(z,u) = 0 with the second
best alternative Cov(z,y) = 0, or (3) using both (1) and (2) to make an argument for
instrument exogeneity (Semadeni et al. 2014).
In summary, to test this dissertation’s independent variables (trust, monitoring,
relative alliance identity) for endogeneity problems, three steps were followed:
1) Satisfactory instrumental variables were identified.
2) The instrumental variables were then used to compute 2SLS estimators.
3) The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was run to determine whether endogeneity exists
in the data.
Candidates for instrumental variables came from the control variables used in
this study and two new secondary data variables were collected for the purposes of the
endogeneity test. These variables are referred to here as the environmental variables,
because these variables represent the external business environment within which the
sampled alliances operate. These variables are clearly exogenous to opportunistic
behaviors, because these environmental variables were present before the alliance
started to operate, hence supporting the second criterion (instrument exogeneity) of a
satisfactory instrumental variable. To support the first criterion (instrument relevance), a
correlation matrix between all environmental variables and relational factors was
examined. Variables with the highest correlations with relational factors would indicate
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relevance. Moreover, to further support the theoretical argument made for the second
criterion, opportunistic behaviors were included in the correlation matrix as well. The
environmental variables with the smallest correlation with opportunistic behaviors would
best support the second criterion. Therefore, to satisfy both the first and second
criterion, for any of the environmental variables to be considered as a suitable
instrumental variable candidate it would have to correlate with at least one of the
relational factor variables and not correlate with opportunistic behaviors. Table 23
presents environmental variables that were identified as suitable instrumental variables
for each of the potentially endogenous relational factor variables.

Table 23. Instrumental Variables Used for Endogeneity Test
Relationship to be
tested for
endogeneity

Instrumental Variable

Criterion 1
Cov(z,x) ≠ 0

Criterion 2
Cov(z,y) = 0

Trust - Deviant
Trust - Rogue
Monitoring - Deviant
Monitoring - Rogue
R.A. Identity - Deviant
R.A. Identity - Rogue

Governance Mode
Market Uncertainty
Interpartner Competition
Market Uncertainty
Alliance Inexperience
Alliance Inexperience

.16; p = .031
.13; p = .070
-.14; p = .056
.18; p = .016
.11; p = .148
.11; p = .148

-.00; p = .990
-.08; p = .297
.04; p = .553
-.08; p = .297
-.06; p = .458
.04; p = .635

Criterion 1: Cov(z,x) = Cov(Instrumental Variable, Trust/Monitoring/R.A. Identity)
Criterion 2: Cov(z,y) = Cov(Instrumental Variable, Deviant-personal/Rogue-firm Opportunism)

Now that the instrumental variables were identified, 2SLS regression estimators
were obtained and followed by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in STATA version 13. The
test did not reveal any statistically significant differences between 2SLS and OLS
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estimators. Therefore, it can be concluded that endogeneity is not of concern in the
data. The relevant statistics for each endogeneity test are provided in Table 24.

Table 24. Endogeneity Test Results
Relationship tested

Instrumental Variable

Durbin-WuHausman test
F(1,180)

p value

Trust - Deviant
Trust - Rogue
Monitoring - Deviant
Monitoring - Rogue
R.A. Identity - Deviant
R.A. Identity - Rogue

Governance Mode
Market Uncertainty
Interpartner Competition
Market Uncertainty
Alliance Inexperience
Alliance Inexperience

2.48349
.396324
.096657
.110916
.386986
.184617

.1168
.5298
.7562
.7395
.5347
.6679

H0: the independent variable is exogenous.

Study 2 Hypotheses
The testing of hypotheses was split into three sections. The first section tests
hypotheses between the opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. The second section
examines hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. The final
(third) section tests hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors.

Study 2 Hypotheses: Opportunistic Behaviors and Outcomes
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. Next,
analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
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Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that a negative relationship exists between rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured
using two established measures: (a) financial performance and (b) strategic
performance. With financial performance as the dependent variable, a significant
negative beta coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -.36, p < .01) was found. With
strategic performance as the dependent variable, also a significant negative beta
coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -.45, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypotheses
1a and 1b are supported. Table 25 presents the statistical information from the analysis.

Table 25. Study 2: Rogue-Firm Opportunism and Alliance Performance

H#
Controls
Governance Mode
Environmental Dynamism

Financial
Performance
β
t-value

Strategic
Performance
β
t-value

.06
.04

.85
.58

.01
.12*

.09
1.84

-.36***

-5.21
-.45***

-6.75

6.27***

26.87***

Linear Effects
H1
Rogue-Firm Opp.

a

H1
b

Intercept
R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic
*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

5.60***

22.30

.144
.130
.130***

.219
.206
.199***
10.04***
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16.70***

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that a negative relationship exists between deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured
using two established measures: (a) financial performance and (b) strategic
performance. With financial performance as the dependent variable, a significant
negative beta coefficient for deviant-personal opportunism (β = -.41, p < .01) was found.
With strategic performance as the dependent variable, also a significant negative beta
coefficient for deviant-personal opportunism (β = -.47, p < .01) was found. Thus,
hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. Table 26 presents the statistical information from
the analysis.

Table 26. Study 2: Deviant-Personal Opportunism and Alliance Performance

H#
Controls
Governance Mode
Environmental Dynamism

Financial
Performance
β
t-value

Strategic
Performance
β
t-value

.10
.02

1.45
.31

.06
.10

.84
1.51

-.41***

-6.12
-.47***

-7.26

6.13***

30.16

Linear Effects
Deviant-Personal Opp.
Intercept
R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic
*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

H2a
H2b

5.58***

24.36

.185
.175
.170***

.243
.230
.223***
13.52***
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19.15***

Study 2 Hypotheses: Relational Factors and Opportunistic Behaviors
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors.
Next, analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated
with deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .01,
p = n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported. Table 27 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated
with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .03, p =
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Table 28 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship
with deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. A squared trust term was constructed by
mean centering the trust variable and then multiplying it by itself. Mean centering a
variable helps with any potential multicollinearity problems (Hair et al. 2010). A
significant beta coefficient (β = .57, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported.
Table 27 offers the statistical analysis summary, and Figure 4 depicts the curvilinear
relationship. The U-shaped results suggest that low and high levels of trust are
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associated with increased levels of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors, while
medium levels of trust are associated with the lowest levels of deviant-personal
opportunism.

Figure 4. Curvilinear Relationship: Trust and Deviant-Personal Opportunism
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Table 27. Study 2: Relational Factors and Deviant-Personal Opportunism

H#
Controls
Governance Mode
Environmental Dynamism
Linear Effects
(T) Trust
(M) Monitoring
R.A.Identity

H3
H7

Curvilinear Effects
T2

H5

Interaction
TxM

H9

Model 1
β
t-value

Model 2
β
t-value

Model 3
β
t-value

Model 4
β
t-value

-.03
-.03

.06
-.01

.89
-.17

.06
-.00

.98
-.06

.05
-.00

.97
-.07

-.56***
-.06
.07

-8.85
-.88
1.05

-.88***
.01
.07

-12.24
.15
1.25

-.87***
.01
.07

12.09
.12
1.27

.57***

7.29

.57***

7.17

.02

.26

2.74***

13.85

Intercept

2.03***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.002
-.009

-.37
-.46

22.53

2.77***

12.35

.319
.300
.317***
.20
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13.89

.477
.359
.158***
16.57***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

2.74***

.477
.456
.000
26.72***

22.79***

Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship
with rogue-firm opportunistic behavior. A significant beta coefficient (β = .35, p < .01)
was found. Thus, hypothesis 6 is supported. Table 28 offers the statistical analysis
summary and Figure 5 depicts the curvilinear relationship. The U-shaped results
suggest that low and high levels of trust are associated with increased levels of roguefirm opportunistic behaviors, while medium levels of trust are associated with the lowest
levels of rogue-firm opportunism.

Figure 5. Curvilinear Relationship: Trust and Rogue-Firm Opportunism
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Table 28. Study 2: Relational Factors and Rogue-Firm Opportunism

H#
Controls
Governance Mode
Environmental Dynamism
Linear Effects
(T) Trust
(M) Monitoring
RAI

H4
H8

Curvilinear Effects
T2

H6

Interaction
TxM

H10

Model 1
β
t-value

Model 2
β
t-value

Model 3
β
t-value

Model 4
β
t-value

-.14*
-.01

-.03
.04

-.58
.63

-.04
.04

-.64
.75

-.04
.04

-.66
.72

-.65***
-.01
-.02

-11.28
-.09
-.43

-.91***
.04
-.02

-11.63
.64
-.42

-.90***
.03
-.02

-11.47
.57
-.36

.36***

4.63

.35***

4.53

.02

.44

3.78***

16.27

Intercept

2.83***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.019
.008

-1.86
-.19

26.40

3.80***

15.54

.437
.421
.418***
1.73
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16.31

.498
.481
.061***
27.45***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01

3.78***

.499
.478
.001
29.09***

24.85***

Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 7 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .07, p =
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 7 is not supported. Table 27 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.02, p = n.s.)
was found. Thus, the hypothesis 8 is not supported. Table 28 offers the statistical
analysis summary.
Hypothesis 9
Hypothesis 9 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and
monitoring. To compute the interaction term, both variables were first mean centered.
Mean centering a variable is just a simple algebraic transformation that helps with any
possible multicollinearity concerns. After mean centering, the variance inflation factor
(VIF) for each regression term was analyzed to assess multicollinearity. All VIFs were
below 2, which is significantly below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Hair et al. 2010).
Once there was no concern of multicollinearity, hierarchical linear regression was run
with four models: (1) control variables only, (2) control variables and direct effects of
relational factors, (3) controls, direct effects, and the curvilinear trust effect, and (4)
controls, direct effects, curvilinear trust, and the two-way interaction between trust and
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monitoring. The full model 4 results indicate a non-significant beta coefficient (β = .02, p
= n.s.) for the interaction between trust and monitoring. Thus, hypothesis 9 is not
supported. Table 27 offers the statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 10
Hypothesis 10 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will
reduce rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and
monitoring. A similar approach to analyze the interaction and multicollinearity to the one
used for hypothesis 9 was applied here. VIFs remained below the value of 2; thus,
multicollinearity is not present in the data. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .02, p =
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 10 is not supported. Table 28 offers the statistical
analysis summary.

Study 2 Hypotheses: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors
Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the
method to test the hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors.
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 11
Hypothesis 11 stated that alliance partner stability is negatively associated with
monitoring. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .26, p < .01) was found. Thus, the
hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction.
Hypothesis 11 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 29 offers the
statistical analysis summary.
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Hypothesis 12
Hypothesis 12 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with
trust. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .47, p < .01) was found. Thus,
hypothesis 12 is supported. Table 29 offers the statistical analysis summary.
Hypothesis 13
Hypothesis 13 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with
relative alliance identity. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .16, p < .05) was
found. Thus, hypothesis 13 is supported. Table 29 offers the statistical analysis
summary.
The hypotheses, analysis results, and corresponding analysis tables are all
summarized in Table 30.

Post-Hoc Analysis
Some of the results in both Study 1 and 2 were contradictory to game theory.
Specifically, the results for the hypotheses 11 in both studies were significant but in the
opposite direction than hypothesized. The results suggested that in a stable alliance
relationship there is a need to monitor alliance partners more extensively. This finding is
contradictory to theory.
The variable alliance partner stability was constructed as a composite variable
that consisted of partner proximity and partner independence dimensions. This
approach has been used in studies considering external market stability, but not in
studies examining internal alliance partner stability. Therefore, to assure that the
contradictory findings are not due to this composition, a series of hierarchical linear
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regressions were run with the two dimensions (partner independence and partner
proximity) as separate variables rather than as dimensions of alliance partner stability
variable. The results of these regressions analysis are presented in Table 31 (Study 1)
and Table 32 (Study 2).
To perform the analysis each of the hypotheses H11-13 was split into part “a”
and part “b”, representing partner independence and partner proximity respectively. The
results indicated that the beta coefficients for each variable and hypotheses remain
positive; thus, confirming the composite variable results. Moreover, the results indicated
that in Study 1 it is predominantly the partner proximity that offers more significant
results, while in Study 2 it is predominantly the partner independence that offers more
significant results. Perhaps the sample utilized in each study explains the differences.
The student sample in Study 1, may see partner’s similarities when it comes to running
a business and interacting with business partners as more important. University
students often rely on social cues when it comes to establishing relationships. The
business professionals sample in Study 2 may view independence from their partner as
a more indicative aspect of stable relationship conditions than cultural proximity
between the two firms. This difference may also stem from the use of simulation versus
real money. It may be more salient that a firm’s bottom line will be affected by a partner
who wields more power in an alliance than by a partner who has different organizational
culture. This point has been expressed by one of the respondents to the survey in Study
2. He commented in an open text box at the end of the survey as follows.
Our alliance is with a huge corporation and we are a small break-even
organization. Our immediate need for growth is not shared by the partner who
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will not be affected if the alliance fails. Have a huge partner is good, but getting
their attention and focus is very difficult. Lately, things are improving.
In this specific strategic alliance, a large and established partner knowingly
dictates the rules of the partnership. The smaller partner is dependent on the larger
power wielding partner. Similar imbalance of power was expressed by other
respondents. For example,
We are a small high tech company that has had alliances with several
major U.S. corporations. In each case the large corps eventually took extreme
advantage of the relationship to the detriment of our organization. Promises
were made via contracts or through top management assurances that were
purposely violated at some point in the relationship after they had the technical
knowledge or advantage they desired from the relationship. One organization
copied confidential info secretly and then tried to put us out of business after they
copied and learned from us. Another blatantly breached a very large contract
worth 10's of millions that we had to fight legally, and a third squeezed us out for
a fraction of the return they promised in the relationship when they knew we
needed money during the downturn.
In accordance with the results, partner independence is often key to establishing
a stable environment in which the alliance relationship can thrive.
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Table 29. Study 2: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors
Dependent Variable:

Monitoring
H#

Controls
Governance Mode
Environmental Dynamism

Trust

β

t-value

β

t-value

Relative Alliance
Identity
β
t-value

-.02
.08

-.31
1.17

.06
-.01

.92
-.21

.08
.01

1.02
.04

.26***

3.63
.47***

7.08
.16**

2.12

1.90***

8.90

Main Effects
Alliance Partner Stability

H11
H12
H13

Intercept

3.41***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.081
.065
.068***

15.01

4.18***

22.79

.233
.220
.215***
5.24***

.035
.019
.024**
18.16***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
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2.15*

Table 30. Study 1 and 2: Hypotheses Results
H#

Hypothesis

H1

Rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated
with alliance performance.
Deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are negatively
associated with alliance performance.
Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors.
Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with roguefirm opportunistic behaviors.
Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors.
Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors.
Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviantpersonal opportunistic behaviors.
Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm
opportunistic behaviors.
The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct
effects of trust or monitoring.
The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce roguefirm opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or
monitoring.
Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with
monitoring.
Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust.
Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative
alliance identity.

H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9

H10

H11
H12
H13
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Study 1
Results
Supported

Study1
Tables
13

Study 2
Results
Supported

Study2
Tables
25

Overall
Results
Supported

Supported

14

Supported

26

Supported

Supported

15

27

Not
Supported
Supported

16
15

Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported

Partial
Support
Not
Supported
Supported

Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported

16

Supported

28

15

Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Not
Supported

27

Not
Supported

16

Not
Supported

28

Not
Supported

Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported
Supported

17

Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported
Supported

29

Significant in
opposite dir.
Supported
Supported

16
15

17
17

28
27

28
27

29
29

Partial
Support
Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Partial
Support

Table 31. Study 1: Partner Independence, Proximity and Relational Factors
Dependent Variable:
H#
Controls
UniverseID
Universe Quarters
Main Effects
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity

H11a
H11b
H12a
H12b
H13a
H13b

Monitoring

Trust

β

t-value

β

t-value

Relative Alliance
Identity
β
t-value

-.24
.03

-2.46
.30

-.12
-.06

-1.40
-.74

-.10
-.07

-1.19
-.84

.17*
.41***

1.89
4.49
.20**
.57***

2.62
7.45
.43***
.39***

5.87
5.37

4.85***

10.47

Intercept

6.24***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.275
.253
.251***

10.73

6.68***

11.98

.480
.463
.458***
12.24***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
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.516
.501
.494***
29.72***

34.36***

Table 32. Study 2: Partner Independence, Proximity and Relational Factors
Dependent Variable:
H#
Controls
Governance Mode
Environm. Dynamism
Main Effects
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity
Partner Independence
Partner Proximity

H11a
H11b
H12a
H12b
H13a
H13b

Monitoring

Trust

β

t-value

β

t-value

Relative Alliance
Identity
β
t-value

-.02
.05

-.26
.62

.06
-.03

.91
-.44

.08
-.01

1.03
-.19

.30***
.08

4.13
1.10
.34***
.34***

5.16
5.29
.16**
.07

2.09
.93

1.37***

3.39

Intercept

2.43***

R2
Adjusted R2
R2 change
F statistic

.112
.092
.099***

5.73

2.72***

8.02

.275
.259
.256***
5.61***

*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
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.042
.021
.032*
16.89***

1.96

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS

While Chapter 4 offered detailed statistical analysis and results of the
hypothesized relationships, this chapter discusses the results in connection to strategic
alliances literature and game theory. Furthermore, the discussion offered in this chapter
outlines possible reasons why some of the unexpected but intriguing results occurred.
Following the discussion of the results, theoretical and managerial implications are
outlined, limitations to the research are pointed out, opportunities for future research are
explored, and concluding remarks close this research.

Discussion
The primary purpose of this research was to empirically test how relational
factors influence two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliance relationships.
Opportunistic behavior is often explored in interfirm relationships research, yet we don’t
know the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism
label (Seggie, Griffith, and Jap 2013; Wathne and Heide 2000). Therefore, using game
theory as guidance, this dissertation examined relational factors and their influence on
two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances. This research differentiated
between deviant-personal (individual-level) and rogue-firm (firm-level) opportunistic
behaviors. Relational factors considered in this dissertation were trust, monitoring, and
relative alliance identity.
The hypothesized relationships were tested across two studies. Study 1 utilized a
behavioral business simulation to collect objective secondary data in addition to primary
data collected through a survey. It investigated ongoing vertical alliances between
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buyers and sellers within a simulated microcomputers industry. While these alliances
were ongoing, the parties were aware of the termination date from the beginning of the
relationship. Study 2 sampled business executives who served as key informants for
their respective strategic alliances. The sample was obtained from the SDC Platinum
database. The study relied on a survey data collection and some secondary data that
were also obtained from the SDC Platinum database. The study investigated ongoing
strategic alliances without a known termination date.
In general, there is some support for the hypothesized relationships. However,
some of the hypothesized relationships were significant, but in the opposite direction,
while others were not supported. The overall results warrant differentiation between the
two types of opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, out of the relational factors explored
here, trust appears to be the key driver to minimizing opportunism, especially deviantpersonal opportunism. Most interestingly, it does so in a non-linear way. Lastly, the
stability between alliance partners plays a significant role in explaining the relational
factors. To help with understanding the discussion presented below, please refer to
Table 30 at the end of Chapter 4 for a presentation of the hypotheses and results
across both studies.

Discussion: Opportunism and Alliance Performance
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Without any doubt, hypotheses 1 and 2 clearly indicate that no matter what type
of opportunistic behavior is considered, such a misbehavior will always have a negative
impact on the performance of both partners. Study 1 revealed that when the alliance
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partner is perceived as being opportunistic (deviant-personal and rogue-firm), their
objective ROA and gross profit generated from the focal relationship is significantly
lower. Study 2 revealed that when the focal firm perceives an alliance partner as being
opportunistic (deviant-personal and rogue-firm), then the focal firm’s performance
declines. Together, these results suggest that when a firm in an alliance is viewed as
opportunistic, it does not only hurt their partner’s performance, but it hurts their own firm
as well. Moreover, it is not only the perception of the firm being opportunistic in a
strategic manner, but arguably and more importantly, it is the perception that certain
individuals from the partner firm are misbehaving that causes performance problems for
both alliance partners.

Discussion: Relational Factors and Opportunism
Hypotheses 3 and 4
Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal
opportunistic behavior in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Therefore, there is partial support.
The game theory literature has a clear explanation for this discrepancy across the two
studies. All involved parties in Study 1 know that at the latest the relationship will end
when the simulation ends. Study 2 examines relationships that are ongoing, and the
end date of the relationship is not known. Experimental game theory suggests that in
games with a known end, partners require more monitoring than games with an
unknown end to assure continuous cooperation and to minimize misbehaviors. The endgame strategic decisions can be different from an ongoing game’s strategic decisions.
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Furthermore, it is interesting that in both studies monitoring is not significantly
associated with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. This finding, or the lack of a
significant finding, further strengthens the point made earlier in this chapter’s discussion
that monitoring behaviors of individuals may be more revealing than simply monitoring
the strategic behavior of the partner-firm as a whole. Observing and managing how the
counterparts from the partner-firm behave towards the focal firm’s employees may be
more fruitful to the positive outcomes of the alliance, especially when the end of the
relationship is approaching and known.
Hypotheses 5 and 6
The results offered in this dissertation show strong support for the hypothesized
curvilinear relationship between trust and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior
across both studies. This finding provides evidence that when trust is not present
between alliance partners, opportunistic behaviors are more likely to occur.
Furthermore, the curvilinear relationship suggests that, initially, trusting an alliance
partner helps to lower opportunistic behaviors, but it helps only at a diminishing rate. At
a certain point, too much trust actually becomes counterproductive. Too much trust
invites alliance partners to misbehave, again.
In the extant interfirm relationship literature, trust is seen as the key ingredient
behind a successful business relationship. The negative linear relationship between
trust and opportunism over the years has become a law-like proposition. However, more
recent literature has started to question this proposition. First of all, the concept of trust
is a part of the relationship metaphor that is dangerously too often applied to interfirm
research. Recent research argues that such a relationship metaphor can create tension
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and obscure experiences of the parties to the interfirm relationship (Blocker, Houston,
and Flint 2012). The desire for relational bonds in interfirm dealings can become a
catalyst for the “dark side” of trust. Anecdotal evidence of the “dark side” of trust is
present in the literature (Anderson and Jap 2005; Atuahene-Gima and Li 2002;
Gundlach and Cannon 2010) but has not been empirically proven until this dissertation.
Study 2 results also show strong support for the curvilinear relationship between
trust and rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors, but this finding is not supported in Study 1.
With this said, the non-hypothesized negative linear effect between trust and both types
of opportunistic behaviors is strongly significant across both studies. Perhaps the
curvilinear relationship between trust and rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors did not
show significant results in Study 1 due to the fact that the relationships in the simulation
are shorter lived than the relationships from the real business world in Study 2. One’s
true motive behind establishing trust with others may need more time to transpire.
Hypotheses 7 and 8
The relationship between relative alliance identity and opportunistic behaviors is
mostly not supported across the two studies, except for rogue-firm opportunistic
behaviors in Study 1. There, the hypothesized relationship is significant in the opposite
direction. The significance in the opposite direction is interesting to explore. It might
suggest that firms that identify more with their partners perceive partners’ behaviors with
a more critical eye. What otherwise, under low relative alliance identity, would be
perceived as an acceptable behavior, is perceived as a more serious misbehavior under
high relative alliance identity. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive to theory. The
finding suggests that identifying with alliance partners can be a tricky proposition. On
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one hand, game theory and social identity theory suggest that highly identified parties
will enjoy a more cooperative environment. In other words, less opportunistic behavior
will be present in such relationships. However, what little misbehavior presents itself
may be viewed more harshly by a party that highly identifies with the offender.
Hypotheses 9 and 10
The interaction between trust and monitoring and its impact on deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors is supported in Study 1. It is not supported in Study 2 and it is
not supported for rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors across both studies.
These findings suggests two points. First, in Study 1 a significant result was
found for the influence of the interaction on deviant-personal opportunism but no
significance was found for the rogue-firm opportunism. This again illustrates the point
that strategic alliances literature cannot ignore individual level opportunistic behaviors.
Focusing on firm-level opportunism has offered valuable insights; however, more can be
learned by shifting focus to deviant-personal opportunism.
Second, a more interesting finding, is the way the significant interaction behaves
in Study 1 (refer to Figure 3 on p.113 in Chapter 4). The interaction suggests that
having monitoring mechanisms in place is always more beneficial to minimizing deviantpersonal opportunism than not having monitoring mechanisms. This is especially true
under high levels of trust. Looking at the graph’s low monitoring solid curve, one can
see that eventually trust becomes misused in the simulation setting. Hence, the solid
curve uptick at high levels of trust. Only when partners monitor their counterparts they
do not fall prey to trusting their partners too much. Hence, the dashed curve does not
switch its slope from negative to positive.
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Game theory offers an interesting explanation for this finding. In Study 1, a
sample of undergraduate students was surveyed. They engaged in a simulation of
strategic interfirm relationships with a known end. Game theory suggests that strategic
decisions in a partnership change as the likelihood of the end of the partnership
increases (Normann and Wallace 2012). These strategic decisions change even further
as the partnership termination date becomes known (Warnick and Slonin 2004). The
end-game strategies change such that partners often choose to act opportunistically to
gain as much economic rent as possible out of the partnership before it ends. Having
monitoring mechanisms in place can bring more certainty into a relationship with a
known termination date, especially under high trust conditions. Monitoring mechanisms
act as a counterbalance to alliance partner employees’ exposure due to increased
levels of trust that was established with their counterparts from the other alliance partner
firm. Game theory suggests that such end-game strategies are usually not as evident in
ongoing partnerships where the termination date is not determined, which would point to
the not-significant interaction in Study 2. In Study 2, sample of ongoing strategic
alliances was surveyed, where the relationship end date is not known.
In summary, when the end to a strategic alliance is known, relying solely on high
trust in your partner, may have detrimental result for the focal firm. Establishing
monitoring mechanisms in such a situation can at least signal to the focal firm
employees that their high trust in their counterparts is being abused and appropriate
steps can be taken to minimize the effects of the opportunistic behavior under high trust.
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Discussion: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors
Hypotheses 11, 12, and 13
Hypothesis 11 introduced the negative relationship between alliance partner
stability and monitoring. The relationship is significant across the two studies but in an
opposite direction. Stability between partners may make the partners complacent and
unworried, thus making them vulnerable to attacks. Hence, the results show a positive
relationship where more stability translates into more monitoring of partners. More
monitoring acts as a countermeasure to complacent conditions. It can be viewed as the
silence before the storm situation. Silence, or stability, may be suspicious and, thus,
more monitoring is needed to reassure oneself that all is well and sound. If no
monitoring mechanisms are in place, the storm may come as a surprise and destroy
any value that was built as a result of the alliance.
The last two hypotheses, hypotheses 12 and 13, predicted that stable conditions
translate into more trust and higher levels of relative alliance identity. These results are
in line with game theory and social identity theory. When alliance partners’ cultures are
similar and the partnership operates on an equal basis, then it is easier to know and
trust the other partner of the alliance. Moreover, under such conditions employees from
both partner-firms can more easily identify with their counterparts since they share a
similar organizational culture and pursue a common goal.

Implications
Theoretical
Several interesting theoretical implications can be drawn from this research. First
of all, more hypotheses were found to be significant when deviant-personal rather than
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rogue-firm opportunism was considered. Existing strategic alliance literature does not
explore deviant-personal opportunism. Future research in strategic alliances can gain
new insights by re-conceptualizing opportunism at the individual level. Such
conceptualization of opportunism is likely to bring additional explanatory power to
studies about strategic alliances. Moreover, the relationship metaphor used in interfirm
literature originates from interpersonal relationships. Therefore, if scholars are to use
the relationship metaphor to study interfirm phenomena, then it may be more
appropriate to operationalize measures used for such research at the individual level.
To this date, the interfirm relationship literature has empirically tested only the
linear hypothesis that more trust always improves the relationship and its outcomes.
However, more recent literature offers anecdotal and some qualitative research
evidence that too much trust can be detrimental to a successful strategic alliance. This
research clearly proves empirically that indeed that is the case. The theories applied in
interfirm literature should reevaluate hypothesized relationships between trust and other
constructs of interest. Linear relationships offer only a limited understanding of trust.
Going beyond linear relationships offers a more telling and complete picture.
This research offers an intriguing finding when it comes to parties who highly
identify with each other. Alliance partners that identify with each other exhibited a higher
perception of opportunistic behaviors of their partners. This finding contrasts with what
game theory and social identity suggest. Specifically, the finding suggests that there
may be a dual purpose to creating teams where members highly identify with each
other. Such identification lowers the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors occurring and
perhaps also lowers the significance of the misbehavior. However, at the same time
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highly identified alliance teams may perceive even a miniscule act of opportunism as a
strong offense. Future research needs to explore this explanation in more detail.
The interactive effect of trust and monitoring on deviant-personal opportunism is
not necessarily the same under all conditions. In the case where research focuses on
ongoing interfirm relationships with a known termination date, having monitoring
mechanisms present is overall always beneficial, but it is more beneficial under high
trust than under low trust conditions. Theories and studies incorporating this interactive
term into their models should carefully evaluate their population of interest.
In general, stability between alliance partners has a positive effect on the
partnership. It promotes trust and the sense of identity between the partners.
Unexpectedly, it also increases the need to monitor partners. This is counter to game
theory and to transaction cost economics theory.
Managerial
While strategic alignment may be in sync across alliance partner firms’
management, not managing alliance personnel at the operational level may translate to
perceptions of employees from the partner firm as acting opportunistically, which
consequently lowers the performance of both partners. In other words, a strategic
alliance management team should not only focus on metrics that manage and monitor
the partner-firm, but should also strive to develop metrics of relational factors between
the two partner-firms’ personnel. Understanding how the boundary spanners from both
firms interact and behave towards each other can improve overall perceptions of how
the strategic relationship is doing.
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Strategic alliance management teams, but more importantly the boundary
spanners from each partner-firm, should develop trust-based relationships but at the
same time should be wary of their counterparts from the partner-firm. Trust can be
misused. Incorporating discussions about personnel’s relationships with their
counterparts at a partner-firm into periodic performance reviews may be a way to offer
balance-checks for the personnel. These balance-checks could help strategic alliance
personnel to develop healthy relationships with their counterparts without falling prey to
the dark side of trust-based relationships. For example, one respondent expressed that
it is the relationships among people that determine how successful an alliance will
become.
It is probably obvious but the longer a particular relationship is in place the
more management changes the relationship experiences. These changes can
be positive or negative and so the longer the relationship the more ebb and flow
each party experiences. While contracts cover the Ts and Cs, in my experience
it is always about the relationship between people that make these work or not.
Empowering alliance employees with techniques that allow them to monitor and
evaluate their relationships might be one way to deal with the potentially damaging
trust-based relationships. The results of this dissertation indicate that having monitoring
programs in place can not only prevent opportunistic behaviors, but also prevent
employees from trusting their counterparts from the alliance partner firm. Various IT
systems already exist that allow management to monitor the performance of their
business partner. Implementing similar IT systems that allow individuals to monitor their
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relationships with their counterparts can be beneficial to maintaining healthy levels of
trust and to keep deviant-personal opportunism under control.
A big topic among the strategic alliance leaders is this idea of how much sense of
unity (i.e., identity) should be created among alliance employees who come together
from often differing organizational cultures. This discussion stems from the fact that
alliances lay in between arm’s length relationships and mergers and acquisition. In
arm’s length relationships, partners don’t have the need to create a sense of identity. In
mergers and acquisitions, it is a major challenge to completely unify two organizational
cultures. Often, this process causes organizational restructuring. Alliances fall in the
middle. Alliances between two firms are the majority of times formed for certain period
of time. Employees assigned to the alliance may feel a loss of identity. Corporate
initiatives that help these employees to build a new sense of identity do a great job.
However, they are not effective at minimizing the possibility of employees going native
so to speak. In other words, they don’t focus on pulling the employees back to their
original firm once the alliance has ended. This research suggests that building a sense
of identity can also introduce a heightened level of sensitivity among employees when it
comes to evaluating opportunistic acts of other alliance employees. This dimension
should not be undermined as it can create tensions that potentially could be worse than
the opportunistic acts themselves.
When entering a strategic alliance with a new business partner, it is important to
evaluate whether stable conditions can exist between the two firms. Lack of stability can
influence the degree to which the employees will trust each other, how easily they will
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build a sense of identity among themselves, and how much monitoring will be required
to assure a healthy relationship.

Limitations
As with any study, this research is not without its limitations. Clearly, the crosssectional research design limits the extent to which causal relationships can be inferred.
Longitudinal data would be of great interest here. In phenomena that mimic prisoner’s
dilemma settings, strategic decisions are made across rounds of decisions. Often
strategic alliance partners make strategic decisions based on their partner’s strategic
move from the last round of decisions. While obtaining longitudinal data continues to be
a challenge in strategic alliance literature, the benefits of pursuing it are enormous.
Another limitation of this research, specifically applicable to Study 2, is the
collection of perceptual performance data through a survey. Even in the case of publicly
traded companies which are required to produce financial statements to their
stakeholders, obtaining performance data solely as a result of a specific strategic
alliance remains a challenge for researchers. Moreover, employees from both privatelyheld and publicly-traded companies are often unable to share any information, yet alone
the performance data, due to non-circumvention/non-disclosure (NCND) agreements
that they sign with their employers. This is where Study 1 and its use of the simulated
business setting comes to be very useful. If researchers cannot obtain objective
performance data from actual strategic alliances, then obtaining objective performance
data from simulated business environments is the second-best alternative.
While this research tests for endogeneity problems in its data, the test of
endogeneity has its limitations. The test performs only as well as the instrumental
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variables introduced to the test. While the instrumental variables introduced in this
research meet the endogeneity test criteria, one could always make an argument that
yet better instrumental variables may exist out there. Longitudinal data yet again could
be beneficial to solving endogeneity concerns.
The measure of deviant-personal opportunism is a new measure created for the
purposes of this dissertation. It has been adapted based on an existing opportunism
measure. The adaptation required significant changes. While the measurement model
demonstrated that the measure meets validity and reliability criteria, it still may be
beneficial for future research to go through more detailed scale development process.
The scale development process is likely to further improve the measure and,
consequently, the accuracy of future research findings.

Future Research
Future research opportunities exist that can enhance our understanding of the
phenomena and theoretical relationships explored in this dissertation. Future studies of
strategic alliances should take extra care to collect data that indicate to the researchers
whether the alliance surveyed has a termination date in place. End game strategies can
make a difference in partners’ relational values and behavior.
While this research has not attempted to test a multi-level model, one may also
view the use of deviant-personal (individual) and rogue-firm (firm) level analysis of
opportunistic behavior in a single conceptual model as problematic. It could be
beneficial to our understanding of opportunism if the deviant-personal opportunism was
examined in isolation from the rogue-firm opportunism. This has not been done in
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strategic alliances, since the introduction of deviant-personal opportunism into this
literature stream is offered by this dissertation.
Great research opportunities exist for interfirm relationships scholars in simulated
business environments. Business simulations have evolved a great deal over the years.
These simulations no longer are linear in their plot and are more interactive in nature.
Their environments become more complex and mimic real business world scenarios
very closely. The data that can be collected through simulated business environments
can be more telling and more objective than survey data or arguably even than
secondary data from actual interfirm relationships. Secondary databases are often not
kept up to date, and their variable definitions change, which poses a risk to researchers.
The interactive term between trust and monitoring and its impact on deviantpersonal opportunism is an interesting topic that a future study could explore further. As
mentioned earlier, game theory suggests that monitoring mechanisms are likely to be
more valuable in trusting relationships when the end of the relationship is known. On the
other hand, game theory suggests that having monitoring mechanisms present when
the end of the relationship is not on an immediate horizon can actually harm the trusting
relationship and ultimately cause more opportunistic behaviors. While this theoretical
argument was not explicitly tested a priori in this dissertation, the hypothesis 9 findings
in this dissertation land some support to it. Future study could do two things to better
understand this interaction. A single environment could be used to explore the
differences between known versus not known strategic alliance horizons. A business
simulation may serve as an excellent environment for this purpose. Second, the future
study may gain more precise insights be differentiating between behavioral- and
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outcome-based monitoring (Gundlach and Cannon 2010) and goodwill and competence
trust (Das and Teng 2001) and how the interactions among these types of monitoring
and trust affect deviant-personal opportunism under the different horizon rules.
Another study utilizing the business simulation can focus on collecting and
analyzing dyadic data. One of the major limitations in the strategic alliance literature
stems from the use of cross-sectional data and the lack of the use of dyadic data. This
limitation is accepted due to the difficulty obtaining dyadic data in this research stream.
The simulation used here is capable of generating a sample of supplier-buyer dyads
with objective performance data. Dyadic data has the potential to offer a fuller picture of
any studied phenomenon in the interfirm relationships literature. For example, exploring
how both parties to a relationship perceive each other when it comes to deviantpersonal opportunism could offer additional insights. Moreover, exploring these dyads
longitudinally, across the business quarters played out in this simulation, could offer
insight into how perception of opportunism builds up over time. Finding a tipping point at
which alliance partners will find opportunistic acts by a partner as a direct threat and
exploring possible correcting mechanisms that can help partners reverse the course of
perceived opportunistic acts would be valuable to theory and practice.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation offers a fresh look at opportunistic behaviors in
strategic alliances. When studying relational factors and how they affect opportunism,
more insightful findings can be realized when focus is shifted to deviant-personal
opportunistic behaviors. This specific literature stream suffers from somewhat of a
myopic view stemming from a heavy focus on transaction cost economics theory, which
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conceptualizes opportunism at the firm-level only. Realizing this and exploring new
theoretical perspectives can be useful to further unpacking the complexities of
opportunistic behaviors.
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APPENDIX A: Study 1 and Study 2 Measures
ABC: scratched-through items marks the items that were eliminated during the CFA
stage.
Rogue-Firm Opportunism
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate to what extend would you
agree/disagree with the following statements
about the two supply chain partners.

Please indicate to what extend would you
agree/disagree with the following statements
about your alliance partner firm.

This partner exaggerated needs to get what it
desires.

Our partner firm exaggerated needs to get what it
desires.

This partner was not always sincere.

Our partner firm is not always sincere.

This partner altered facts to get what it wanted.

Senior management at the partner firm alters facts
to get what it wants.

This partner breached agreements to its benefit.

Our partner firm breaches formal or informal
agreements to its benefits.

Deviant-Personal Opportunism
Study 1

Study 2

Please offer your perception of the two supply
chain partners across the following dimensions:

To what extend would you agree/disagree that
certain individuals from the partner firm …

People offered their best effort to make the
relationship work (R)

… withhold effort

People responded in timely manner to our inquires
(R)

… responded in timely manner to our inquiries (R)

People delivered on their promises (R)

… do not deliver on their promises

People provided truthful information to us (R)

… provide false information

People followed closely their verbal agreements
with our firm (R)

… breach agreements to benefit personally

Monitoring
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate the extent to which your firm
monitored how good of partners the two supply
chain partners were across the following areas.

Please indicate the extent to which your firm
monitors the alliance partner firm across the
following aspects.

Overall investment in the relationship

Partner’s overall investment in the relationship

Level of cooperation

Partner’s level of cooperation

Activities outside of our supply chain relationship

Partner’s activities outside of the relationship

Response speed when undergoing contract
negotiations.

Response timeliness of the partner
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Trust
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about the two supply
chain partners.

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about your alliance
partner firm.

This partner kept promises it made to our firm

The alliance partner firm keeps promises it makes
to our firm

This partner was not always honest with us (R)

The alliance partner firm is not always honest with
us (R)

We believe the information this partner provided to
us

We believe the information that the alliance
partner firm provided to us

This partner was trustworthy

This alliance partner firm is trustworthy

This partner was genuinely concerned that our
supply chain relationship succeeds

This alliance partner firm is genuinely concerned
that our alliance succeeds

Our firm trusts that this partner kept our best
interests in mind

Our firm trusts that the alliance partner firm keeps
our best interests in mind

Relative Alliance Identity
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements.

Please complete the following statements by
selecting the degree to which you personally
identify with the alliance rather than with your firm,
or vice versa.

Seeing both our firm and [partner name] succeed
would feel more satisfying than seeing only our
firm succeed

[my firm/the alliance]’s successes are my
successes

Attacks by other firms on [partner name] would
feel like attacks on our own firm

When someone criticizes the colleagues in [my
firm/the alliance], it feels like a personal insult

Someone praising our relationship with [partner
name] would feel like a personal compliment

When someone praises [my firm/the alliance], it
feels like a personal compliment

If I had to make a choice between doing what was
best for my firm or for the supply chain relationship
with [partner name], I would do what was best for
the relationship

If I had to make a choice between doing what was
best for my firm or for the alliance, I would do what
was best for [my firm/the alliance]

When I talked with others about the relationship
with [partner name], I usually would say “we”
rather than “they”

When I talk about the colleagues in [my firm/the
alliance], I usually say “we” rather than “they”
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Alliance Partner Stability: Partner Independence
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about the two supply
chain partners.

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about your alliance
partner.

This partner provided vital resources we would
find difficult to obtain from other resellers (R)

Our alliance partner provides vital resources we
would find difficult to obtain elsewhere (R)

It would have been difficult to replace this partner
(R)

It would be difficult to replace our alliance partner
(R)

Our strategic objectives would suffer greatly if we
would have lost this partner (R)

Our strategic objectives would suffer greatly if we
would lose our alliance partner (R)

Alliance Partner Stability: Organizational Proximity
Study 1

Study 2

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about your
relationship with the two ranked supply chain
partners.

Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about your alliance
partner firm.

The management style of [partner name] is very
similar to the management style of our firm

The management style of our alliance partner is
very similar to the management style of our
organization

The business culture of [partner name] is very
similar to ours

The corporate culture of our alliance partner is
very similar to ours

The business practices of [partner name] are very
similar to the business practices of our firm

The business practices of our alliance partner are
very similar to the business practices of our
organization

Alliance Performance: Financial Performance
Study 1

Objective performance data were collected from
the simulation.
1) ROA
2) Gross Profit

Study 2
For the following questions please consider your
relationship with [partner name] during 2014. Rate
the degree to which the alliance was effective at
achieving the following outcomes relative to its
original objectives
Return on investment
Return on assets
Sales
Profit margin
Market share
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Alliance Performance: Strategic Performance
Study 1

Study 2
For the following questions please consider your
relationship with [partner name] during 2014.
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree
with the following statements about the alliance.

Not applicable, objective data were used.

During the last year, the collaboration provided a
great opportunity to learn from our partner firm
Collaborating with this alliance partner firm during
the last year was a wise business decision
Our strategic objectives set for this alliance for the
year 2014 were achieved
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APPENDIX B: Simulation Incentive – Relationship Dashboard
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APPENDIX C.1: Introductory Email to Contacts
Dear [FIRST NAME],
I am a PhD student in marketing at the University of Tennessee. I am currently working on my
dissertation. My dissertation would greatly benefit from your professional expertise. It would be
very helpful if you could spare 10 to 15 minutes of your time to answer my dissertation survey.
Completing the survey will ...
1) … allow me to prepare and share my dissertation findings report with you.
2) … raise $20.00 towards a donation to St. Jude Children’s Hospital.
3) … get me closer to finishing my dissertation.
The goal of this survey, and overall my dissertation, is to contribute to existing knowledge
regarding B2B relationships.
Your company and your contact information was obtained from SDC Platinum database, which
is available to PhD students through the University of Tennessee. This database compiles a list of
B2B partnerships and strategic alliances.
Can I send you a link to my survey?
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me.
THANK YOU!
Best regards,
Anton P. Fenik
Marketing Ph.D. Candidate
Marketing and Supply Chain Management
The Haslam College of Business Administration
University of Tennessee
afenik@utk.edu; 803-629-5132
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APPENDIX C.2: 1st and 2nd Follow-up Emails to Contacts
Dear [FIRST NAME],
This is my last request for your participation in my dissertation survey. Only 20 more responses
are needed! In return you will receive:
1) A report with my dissertation findings, and
2) I will add $20 towards a donation to St. Jude Children’s Hospital in your name. I am
approaching the $3,500 goal … your response can get me there.
12 minutes of your time can translate into a lot of good!
1) You get the report with potentially insightful findings that may be useful to your
business.
2) We will help medical research at St. Jude’s Children’s Hospital.
3) I will get to finish my dissertation through which I can become a more valuable resource
to the business community.
Can I send you a link to my survey, please?
Thank you!
Best regards,
Anton P. Fenik
Marketing Ph.D. Candidate
Marketing and Supply Chain Management
The Haslam College of Business Administration
University of Tennessee
afenik@utk.edu; 803-629-5132
More background about me:
I am a PhD student in marketing at the University of Tennessee. I am currently working on my
dissertation. Part of my dissertation requires that I collect data from business practitioners like
yourself. Hence, me contacting you regarding participation in my survey. Here is a link to my
University of Tennessee profile:
http://mscm.bus.utk.edu/Students/Current-PhD-Students/Fenik.asp
The goal of this survey, and overall my dissertation, is to contribute to existing knowledge
regarding B2B relationships.
Your company and your contact information was obtained from SDC Platinum database, which
is available to PhD students through the University of Tennessee. This database compiles a list of
B2B partnerships and strategic alliances.
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APPENDIX C.3: Survey Link & Reminders to Opted-In Participants
Email with the survey link after contacts agreed to participate
Dear [FIRST NAME],
Thank you for your reply and willingness to participate.
A link to my Qualtrics survey is below. The link is auto-generated by Qualtrics, which
guarantees anonymity of your response.
[UNIQUE SURVEY LINK HERE]
Best regards,
Anton

Reminder email to contacts who already agreed to participate but failed to complete the
survey after the initial email with the survey link above.
Dear [FIRST NAME],
Thank you again for your willingness to help with my dissertation. This is just a friendly
reminder to complete my survey. For your convenience, you can find a link to my survey
below.
[UNIQUE SURVEY LINK HERE]
I am missing only around 15 responses to meet the sample size necessary for my
dissertation analysis. Your response would make all the difference!
THANK YOU!
Best,
Anton
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